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Abstract
This thesis examines the jurisdictional movement of abortion regulation resulting from R v
Morgentaler and the barriers to abortion which emerged as a result of the transition in the Maritime
provinces. Following decriminalization, the Maritime provinces responded by implementing
health insurance barriers to clinic abortions, restricting access. While contemporary scholarship
has predominantly examined the issue through a health law and positive rights lens, this thesis
asserts that these barriers can most successfully be challenged as a negative rights violation of the
Charter’s section 7 guarantee of security of the person. This is because, although the dichotomy
between positive and negative rights is at times superficial, Canadian courts have taken more
favourably to negative rights challenges, particularly in regard to section 7.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s 1988 judgment in R v Morgentaler1 is celebrated as a
landmark victory for pro-choice advocates and believed by some to have secured a positive right
to abortion in Canada. While the decision to strike down the criminal prohibition enabled more
widespread access, it far from ensured a guaranteed positive right to abortion across the country.
The Morgentaler judgment ensured a negative right: the freedom from state interference by threat
of criminal sanction. Following Morgentaler, Canadian women have been free to access abortion
without fear of criminal prosecution, if they are able to find a service provider, meet the varying
institutional administrative requirements, and afford, when not insured, to pay for it out-of-pocket.
While criminal prohibition no longer exists, a number of barriers to access still remain across the
country.
The jurisdictional movement post-Morgentaler from the federal government’s criminal
law power to the provincial governments’ jurisdiction over healthcare has led to varying responses
in regulation and widespread inconsistencies across the country. Provincial responses to
decriminalization varied, with certain provinces, such as Ontario and Québec, allowing for
increased access to services. All three Maritime provinces responded with dramatic attempts to
restrict service, at times enacting regulations with sanctions and fines comparable to
recriminalization. All three Maritime provinces have also been host to a variety of abortion accessbased litigation, particularly regarding their attempts to prohibit abortions performed outside of
hospitals, as well as their sustained failure to insure abortions performed in clinics, effectively
creating a two-tiered system.

1

R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 82 NR 1 [Morgentaler 1988].
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As this thesis will discuss, prohibitions on clinic funding exacerbate a number of the other
existing barriers to abortion services, including by limiting service providers. In addition,
historically the two-tiered system has proven virtually unsustainable within Canada’s Maritime
provinces. All abortion clinics which have operated in the Maritime provinces without provincial
funding have closed, citing lack of funding as the reason. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated
on two occasions that legislation mandating an in-hospital requirement for abortion is unnecessary
and can be considered unconstitutional as such legislation further exacerbates wait times,
contributing to section 7 violations. Provincial governments’ refusal to fund clinic abortions
effectively produces the same result. As clinics are unable to operate without provincial funding,
women are then forced to either access abortion through the hospital system or to travel outside of
their home province for service.
In order to address these barriers, Canadian legal scholarship has predominantly examined
the issue through either a positive rights lens or the remedies available in Canadian health law, at
times arguing for a multi-faceted approach. While pursuing a positive right to abortion would
ensure comprehensive access to the service, Canadian courts have been reluctant to recognize
positive rights violations. In addition, remedies in Canadian health law have historically proven to
be seldom utilized and have been ineffectual in influencing provincial governments. Although
negative rights claims do not provide for the same extent of redress as positive rights, as this thesis
will discuss, the dichotomy between the two is not always as black and white as some argue. Rights
arguably fall along a spectrum of state intervention at one end, and indifference at the other.
Canadian courts respond more favourably to claims which lie at the non-interventionist or negative
rights end of the spectrum. Therefore, although numerous barriers still exist to abortion today, one
of the most legally tenable approaches to redress would be to challenge the insurance barriers, as
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they are a negative rights infringement resulting from interfering legislation. As this thesis will
also discuss, there are positive rights implications which result from a negative rights challenge.
Insurance barriers effectively produce the same outcomes as prohibiting abortions outside
of hospitals, previously found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. By refusing to fund
clinic abortions provinces are restricting the access framework and forcing women to endure
longer wait times for the procedure as well as, at times, travel great distances to access service.
Both of these factors were previously addressed in the 1988 Morgentaler judgment and found to
violate a woman’s right to security of the person. In addition, the prohibition cannot be considered
to be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice as it is arbitrary and ultimately
hinders the government objectives it purports to promote. While the negative rights challenge will
remove the insurance barrier to abortion, it is still reliant on health care providers opening clinics
to offer service. In addition, insurance restrictions are only one of the numerous barriers to
accessing abortion in Canada’s Maritime provinces. However, evidence from other provinces
demonstrates that when the provincial health plan fully insures clinic abortions, access points for
service providers increase. In addition, as this thesis will discuss, health insurance barriers
aggravate other barriers to access which means addressing insurance barriers helps to minimize
the deleterious effect of other obstacles.
The provincial governments of the Maritime provinces have attempted to restrict abortion
access since the procedure was decriminalized. While political and legal activism has increased
access in the Maritime provinces, insurance prohibitions still remain. Canadian jurisprudence on
abortion access in Canada provides a promising precedent for challenging the problematic
restrictions on health insurance funding through a negative rights challenge. Further, insurance
barriers to abortion create unique obstacles for low-income populations. Canadian human rights
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jurisprudence shows a willingness on the part of Canadian courts to engage section 7 for socioeconomic issues when framed from a negative rights perspective and where the public system is
failing to comprehensively offer a necessary government service.
In outlining the above arguments this thesis begins, in the first chapter, by examining the
historical context of the decriminalization of abortion, the jurisdictional movement from criminal
law to healthcare, as well as the varying provincial responses to decriminalization. In Chapter 2
this thesis will discuss the contemporary barriers to accessing abortion in the Maritime provinces
and the privatized market for clinic abortions which has emerged following decriminalization. In
Chapter 3, this thesis will examine the contemporary scholarship on the issue and the various
approaches to addressing the issue through positive and negative rights, as well as through
Canadian health law. Finally, this thesis will examine the issue through a negative rights lens in
Chapter 4, applying both the Morgentaler judgment and precedent from the Manitoba provincial
court, ultimately asserting that a negative rights challenge to insurance prohibitions in the Maritime
provinces is the most legally tenable approach and will have widespread effects on a number of
other existing barriers. In doing so, this thesis will apply the framework established for assessing
claims under section 7, highlighting how the contemporary health insurance barriers remain in
violation of the Charter.

4

CHAPTER 1- HISTORICAL CONTEXT
I. 1969 Abortion Law
In 1969 then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s government amended the Criminal Code2 in
an attempt to enable an accessible regulatory framework for abortion.3 Karina Ackerman discusses
the amendments saying they were meant to create greater access to abortion but “merely created
the illusion of access.”4 The amendments (now former section 251 of the Criminal Code),
criminalized the “intent to procure a miscarriage”5 outside of the designated scheme provided for
under the Code. The 1969 amendments created a framework which allowed for physicians to
perform abortions at specific institutions with authorization from an approved Therapeutic
Abortion Committee (TAC) deeming that the continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the
life or health of the pregnant woman. The new framework permitted abortion only if performed by
a qualified medical practitioner other than a member of the TAC at an accredited hospital after
garnering the prior approval from a TAC.6 Abortion performed outside of the designated
framework was still in violation of the Criminal Code, punishable up to life imprisonment for
anyone who performed the procedure.7

2

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
Katrina Ackerman, “The Dark Well-Kept Secret: Abortion Experiences in the Maritime Provinces” in Shannon
Stettner, Travis Hay & Kristin Burnett, eds, Abortion: History, Politics and Reproductive Justice (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2017) at 134.
4
Ibid.
5
Morgentaler 1988, supra note 1 at 6.
6
Ibid.
7
Linda Long, “Abortion in Canada” (26 November 2020) online: The Canadian Encyclopedia
<www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/abortion#:~:text=%C2%A9%20Americanspirit%2FDreamstime),Crime%20of%20Abortion%20and%201969%20Amendment,the%20penalty%20was%20two%20years>.
3
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In the 1988 Morgentaler judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada, then Chief
Justice Dickson outlined the process for obtaining an abortion under the scheme. According to
Dickson CJC, in order to access an abortion, the pregnant woman was required to first apply to the
TAC at the accredited hospital for approval. The TAC would then examine the application and
was empowered to issue a certificate allowing the abortion if it was of the opinion that the
“continuation of the pregnancy would be likely to endanger the pregnant woman’s life or health.”8
Once the certificate was issued, a separate qualified medical practitioner was then allowed to
perform the abortion, and the woman to receive it, without criminal liability.9
In the mid-70s, in response to growing concern over whether this scheme was operating
equitably across Canada, the Trudeau government established the Committee on the Operation of
the Abortion Law to examine the operation of the 1969 law, led by sociologist Robin F Badgley.10
The committee’s findings were published almost a decade later in 1977 and would go on to be the
principal evidence cited at the Supreme Court supporting abortion’s decriminalization in 1988.

II. Badgley Report
In 1977 the Committee on the Operation of Abortion Law published a report on its findings,
more commonly known as the Badgley Report. According to the Report, the terms of reference
for the committee were to, “conduct a study to determine whether the procedure provided in the
Criminal Code for obtaining therapeutic abortion is operating equitably across Canada.”11 Further,
the Committee was “asked to make findings on the operation of this law rather than

8

Morgentaler 1988, supra note 1 at 41.
Ibid.
10
Katrina Ackerman & Shannon Stettner, “The Public is Not Ready for This: 1969 and the Long Road to Abortion
Access” (2019) 100: 2 The Canadian Historical Review 239 at 245.
11
Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Abortion Law, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supplies and Services, 1977)
(Chair: Robin Badgley) at 3 [Badgley Report].
9
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recommendations on the underlying policy.”12 After completing the study, the Report’s findings
were clear and extensive: the current legislative scheme operated in a manner that perpetuated
inequitable access to abortion. The Report stated, “the procedures set out for the operation of the
Abortion Law are not working equitably across Canada,”13 as “there was considerable confusion,
unclear standards or social inequity involved with this procedure.”14 The 480-page Report
documented numerous barriers and obstacles to obtaining abortion within the designated
framework in Canada, leading to extensive delays and approximately 9600 Canadian women
travelling to the United States each year to access abortion.15
According to the Report, barriers to accessing abortion in 1977 included: limited
establishments of TACs, long wait times of on average eight weeks, financial costs, and
widespread misinformation. The Report noted many women across the country did not have
reasonable access to hospitals with established TACs, in turn limiting access to approval for
abortions. In order to qualify for a TAC, the designated scheme required the hospital not only be
accredited, but one with “diagnostic services and medical, surgical and obstetrical treatment.”16
According to the Report, the limitations not only restricted the hospitals which could qualify for
TACs but further, of the ones that did qualify, many did not establish TACs. According to the
Badgley Report in 1976, 58.5 per cent of non-military hospitals were deemed ineligible for TACs,
and of the 559 hospitals meeting the procedural requirements only 271 established TACs,
accounting for 20.1 per cent of Canadian hospitals.17 The Report also documented misinformation
to be a substantive barrier to accessing abortion in the 1970s. The Committee observed that a

12

Ibid.
Ibid at 17.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid at 384.
16
Ibid at 88.
17
Ibid at 90 and see Morgentaler 1988, supra note 1 at 45.
13
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number of commercial agencies, based in the United States, intentionally providing
misinformation to Canadian women in order to encourage cross border traffic for the procedure.18
The agencies were known to advertise in Canadian newspapers under the guise of being a resource
for Canadian women looking for information on abortion services. When called, the agencies
provided women with misinformation on gestational limits, costs, and even the legality of the
procedure in Canada.19
One of the most notable barriers to accessing abortion the Report discussed was cost of the
procedure. Financial barriers included widespread extra-billing in certain areas of the country
occurring both before the procedure on referral and then again when the patient attended the
abortion.20 Although at times extra-billing charges occurred without legislative authority, some
provinces—including Nova Scotia and New Brunswick—allowed for extra-billing in their
provincial health insurance frameworks.21 The Report found in 1975-76, 44.8 per cent of the
patients who received an abortion in Nova Scotia were extra-billed, as compared to the national
average of 20.1 per cent.22 In addition, the Report found the charges were not “evenly distributed,”
but “affected most those women who were young, were less well educated, or were newcomers to
Canada.”23 Joanna Erdman speaks to the effect of the 1969 abortion law writing, “criminalization
did not outlaw abortion practice so much as it revealed it, regulated it, and distributed its risks.”24
According to Erdman, criminalizing abortion shaped the abortion market, resulting in a two-tiered
system. Erdman says, “poor and working-class women were largely confined to the vagaries of

18

Badgley Report, supra note 11 at 383.
Ibid.
20
Ibid at 391.
21
Ibid at 394.
22
Ibid at 397.
23
Ibid at 22.
24
Joanna N Erdman, “Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights in Canada” (2017-2018) 49 Ottawa L Rev 221 at 231
[Erdman, “Constitutionalizing Abortion”].
19
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the back alley,” and in contrast, “women with means turned to private spaces, the seclusion of a
physician's office, or a maternity home.25

III.

R v Morgentaler (1988)
In 1988 the inequitable access scheme created by the 1969 amendments faced a

constitutional reckoning when an appeal on an indictment for Dr. Morgentaler and two other
practitioners reached the Supreme Court of Canada. In the 1980s Dr. Morgentaler, and the two
others charged, opened an abortion clinic in Toronto and began to offer services to women who
had not obtained a certificate from a therapeutic abortion committee allowing the procedure.26 The
three doctors were charged with conspiring with intent to procure a miscarriage of a female person,
contrary to former section 251 of the Criminal Code.27 Morgentaler was no novice to challenging
the criminal prohibition on abortion, by 1988 he had spent the better part of the previous two
decades on trial for committing the offence in various provincial courts across the country.28 At
trial, the three doctors were acquitted by a jury, but on appeal the acquittal was set aside and a new
trial ordered.29 This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada where Dr. Morgentaler
argued the Code sections were unconstitutional for violating sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.30
Writing for the majority, then Chief Justice Dickson found the scheme for accessing
abortion as allowed under the Criminal Code in violation of section 7 of the Charter and struck
down the provisions. Citing the barriers documented in the Badgley Report throughout his

25

Ibid.
Morgentaler 1988, supra note 1 at 9.
27
Ibid at 10.
28
Long, supra note 7.
29
Morgentaler 1988, supra note 1 at 11.
30
Ibid.
26
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judgment, Dickson CJC found the impugned scheme interfered with the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person on two grounds. First, Dickson CJC found the delays caused by the scheme
interfered with a woman’s bodily integrity, the consequences of which were “potentially
devastating,”31 due to the time sensitive nature of pregnancy and increased health risks associated
with delaying the procedure.32 Dickson CJC noted, even though the mortality rate for pregnant
women who undergo abortions was low, “the increasing risks caused by delay are so clearly
established,” that he had, “no difficulty in concluding that the delay in obtaining therapeutic
abortions caused by the mandatory procedures of (section) 251 is an infringement of the purely
physical aspect of the individual's right to security of the person.”33 Second, Dickson CJC also
found former section 251 of the Code interfered with a woman’s psychological integrity in
violation of section 7. Discussing evidence from a medical expert at trial Dickson CJC wrote,
“there is increased psychological stress imposed upon women who are forced to wait for abortions,
and that this stress is compounded by the uncertainty whether or not a therapeutic abortion
committee will actually grant approval.”34
Having found two violations of section 7, Dickson CJC inquired into whether the
deprivations were in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In his judgment,
Dickson CJC noted numerous problems with the administration of the scheme, including the
unnecessary requirements hospitals were required to meet in order to establish TACs,35 and a
“failure to provide an adequate standard for therapeutic abortion committees.”36 Specifically,
Dickson CJC spoke to inconsistent and unclear applications of the word “health,” in determining

31

Ibid at 30.
Ibid.
33
Ibid at 32.
34
Ibid at 33.
35
Ibid at 45.
36
Ibid at 48.
32
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whether women were eligible for abortions.37 In totality, Dickson CJC found the administrative
practices could not be considered to work in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.38 Dickson CJC wrote, “[o]ne of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that,
when Parliament creates a defence to a criminal charge, the defence should not be illusory or so
difficult to attain as to be practically illusory.”39
Having determined the framework was in violation of section 7 as the deprivation was not
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, Dickson CJC inquired into whether the
provision could be saved as a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter applying the test
outlined in R v Oakes.40 Although at the first stage of the test, Dickson CJC acknowledged the
government objective of promoting health and safety of pregnant women was sufficient to warrant
state interference, he ultimately found the former Code provisions failed the Oakes inquiry.
Continuing on with the Oakes test, Dickson CJC concluded that the government means could not
satisfy the minimal impairment inquiry at the second stage, or the proportionality inquiry at the
third.41 He wrote, “[t]he procedures established to implement the policy of s. 251 impair s. 7 rights
far more than is necessary because they hold out an illusory defence to many women who would
prima facie qualify under the exculpatory provisions of s. 251(4).”42 Striking down the provision
as arbitrary Dickson CJC said, “to the extent that s. 251(4) is designed to protect the life and health
of

women,

the

procedures

it

establishes

may

actually

defeat

that

objective.”43

37

Ibid.
Ibid at 51.
39
Ibid.
40
R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, [1986] SCJ No 7 [Oakes].
41
Morgentaler 1988, supra note 1 at 60.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
38
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IV. Provinces Gain Jurisdiction Over Abortion
With the federal government’s criminal prohibition struck down, questions of jurisdictional
control over abortion arose in the late 1980s. Emmett Macfarlane discusses a jurisdictional void
resulting from the Morgentaler judgment stating, “Parliament was famously unable to pass
replacement legislation, leaving a vacuum in federal criminal law.”44 Macfarlane says, as a result
provinces were then left with de facto control to regulate abortion through, “their jurisdiction over
health care matters.”45 Colleen Flood, Brian Lahey, and Bryan Thomas discuss provincial authority
over the delivery of healthcare services as resulting from two provisions of the 1867 Constitution
Act.46 This is first, through granting provinces authority to establish, maintain, and manage
hospitals. Then second, under the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, which
provides authority for regulating health care professionals.47
Financing of health jurisdiction and over health more broadly is divided, according to
Flood, Lahey, and Thomas. Provinces have jurisdiction over health insurance by virtue of their
control over property and civil rights.48 However, according to Flood, Lahey, and Thomas, the
federal government maintains some control by means of the federal spending power.49 Under the

44

Emmett Macfarlane, “Positive Rights and Section 15 of the Charter: Addressing a Dilemma”
(2018) 38 Nat'l J Const L 147 at 154 [Macfarlane, “Addressing a Dilemma”].
45
Ibid.
46
Colleen Flood, Brian Lahey & Bryan Thomas, “Federalism and Health Care in Canada: A Troubled Romance?” in
Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution,
(New York: Oxford University Press, Oct 2017) at 449.
47
Ibid at 450. It should be noted that the federal government also has constitutional jurisdiction in health care over
“Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine Hospitals” under section 91(11) of the Constitution
Act. In addition, the federal government has influence over other areas of health care by means of a number of other
constitutional jurisdictions including the criminal law power, the federal government’s power to enact laws affecting
Peace Order and Good Governance, their authority over Indigenous populations, federal penitentiaries, immigration,
and the military. See Martha Butler & Marlisa Tiedemann, “The Federal Role in Health and Health Care” (20
September 2013) online: Library of Parliament
<https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201191E>.
48
Flood, Lahey & Thomas, supra note 46 at 450.
49
Ibid.
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Canada Health Act, (CHA)50 the federal government maintains quasi-control over the provision of
health care across the country. Through their spending power, the federal government provides
cash contributions to the provinces through the Canada Health Transfer.51 The majority of health
care expenditures in Canada, approximately 70 per cent, are funded by public funding.52 The
remaining amounts are covered by private sources such as private insurance and out-of-pocket
expenses.53 In 2019 the Canada Health Transfer accounted for 23.5 per cent of all public health
expenditures across the country.54
The Canada Health Transfer is provided to the provinces contingent on the provinces
establishing and maintaining a health care insurance plan satisfying the requirements of the Act,
with respect to the five program criteria outlined in section 7 of the CHA.55 The five program
criteria include: public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and
accessibility.56 In order for provinces to qualify for their full cash contribution from the federal
government, the province’s health insurance plans must satisfy the five program criteria.57 In
addition, there are also two conditions for receiving the transfer. The provinces are required to
provide the Minister of Health with information regarding provincial health services and further,
must provide recognition to the Canada Health Transfer in “any public documents, or in any

50

Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6 [Canada Health Act].
“Canada Health Act” (24 February 2020) online: Health Canada <www.canada.ca/en/healthcanada/services/health-care-system/canada-health-care-system-medicare/canada-health-act.html>.
52
Sonya Norris, “Federal Funding for Health Care” (29 December 2020) online: Library of Parliament
<https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201845E#:~:text=The%20federal%20c
ontribution%20is%20made,home%20care%20beginning%20in%202017>.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Canada Health Act, supra note 50 at s 7.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
51
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advertising or promotional material, relating to insured health services and extended health care
services in the province.”58
With newfound jurisdictional control post-Morgentaler, each province began testing out
various approaches to regulation, more often than not attempting to implement regulatory barriers
restricting access to abortion. As Rachel Johnstone points out, “the decriminalization of abortion
was not the final battle for women’s reproductive rights, as provincial actions to restrict women’s
right to choose make clear.”59 According to Erin Nelson, following the Morgentaler judgment the
provinces found a new approach to restricting abortion access. Nelson says, “[i]nstead, regulation
of, and access to, abortion services is accomplished by a combination of health care professional
guidelines, hospital policies, and provincial policies relating to access to, and public funding for,
abortion services.”60 However, provincial regulatory responses varied across the country, leaving
widespread inconsistencies in access. Macfarlane observes that in the immediate aftermath, “most
provinces, with the exception of Ontario and Québec, implemented laws or regulations designed
to limit access”61 and although some were struck down as ultra vires, “wide disparities in access
persisted across the country.”62 Rachel Johnstone similarly attributes the response to a “federalpolicy vacuum that emerged around the regulation of abortion services.”63 According to Johnstone,
this led to the reclassification of abortion as a healthcare issue and “failed to provide clear

58

Ibid at s 13.
Rachael Johnstone, “The Politics of Abortion in New Brunswick” (2014) 26:2 Atlantis 73 at 83 [Johnstone,
“Abortion in New Brunswick”].
60
Erin Nelson, “Special Issue: Health Law Autonomy, Equality, and Access to Sexual and
Reproductive Health Care” (2017) 54:3 Alta L Rev 707 at 22.
61
Macfarlane, “Addressing a Dilemma”, supra note 44 at 154.
62
Ibid.
63
Rachael Johnstone, After Morgentaler: The Politics of Abortion in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017) at 79
[Johnstone, “After Morgentaler”].
59

14

protections for women.”64 Johnstone writes the “resulting patchwork of services”65 created
inequalities in access similar to those that lead to the decriminalization.66
Following decriminalization, certain provinces – such as Ontario – saw increased access to
services, while others saw reattempts at criminalization. The Maritime provinces were home to
some of the most severely restrictive responses to the Morgentaler judgment. Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward Island, and New Brunswick all made attempts to limit access to abortion following the
decriminalization and each province saw numerous legal challenges as a result. To this day, New
Brunswick is still facing ongoing litigation due to restrictions on abortion. While numerous
barriers to accessing abortion exist across the country, the Maritime provinces have uniquely
responded to decriminalization by attempting to restrict access through the use of insurance
funding regulations. This barrier, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, allows for
health insurance coverage for abortion only if performed in a hospital setting. As we will see, there
are unique limitations for accessing abortions in hospitals in Canada, including limited service
providers and additional wait times. In addition, historically clinics in the Maritime provinces have
been unable to maintain service without provincial funding. The restrictions disincentivize medical
professionals from performing abortions in clinics and in effect, limit access. The contemporary
resulting access scheme in the Maritime provinces is thus splintered, enabling access for those who
can afford to travel out-of-province to access services and restricting access to hospitals for those
who cannot.
Unsurprisingly, the Maritime provinces have a lower percentage of their population
identifying as pro-choice. According to a Dart & Maru / Blue Voice Canada Pole published by the

64

Ibid.
Ibid at 80.
66
Ibid.
65
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National Post in January of 2020, 22 per cent of people polled in Canada’s Atlantic provinces,67
believe abortion should be illegal during the first three months of pregnancy.68 This was the highest
percentage of all the responding provinces, with Alberta following behind at 18 per cent.69 When
polled regarding the second trimester, 55 per cent of respondents in Atlantic Canada believed
abortion should be illegal during the second three months of pregnancy.70 The Atlantic provinces
maintained the highest percentage of those in favour of illegality, as compared to 43 percent of
respondents in Alberta and Ontario, as well as 39 per cent in BC and Québec.71 With these statistics
in mind, it is not surprising the Maritime provinces attempted to implement further restrictions on
abortion following decriminalization. They also provide insight into the deeper values and beliefs
that may be behind attempts to restrict abortion access by means of insurance funding.
A. 1991 – 2021 Prince Edward Island’s response
According to Joanna Erdman, following the Supreme Court judgment in the 1988 case of
R v Morgentaler, Prince Edward Island’s (PEI) provincial government immediately passed a
resolution stating opposition to any provision of abortion services on the Island.72 The resolution
formally announced the then PEI legislature’s opposition to abortion and called for a new abortion
law.73 In 1991, the government issued notice of a policy restricting funding of abortions for
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residents.74 The policy of the provincial government’s Hospital and Health Services Commission
provided that the province “will only pay for an abortion deemed to be a medical necessity
provided that the abortion is performed at a hospital.”75 In effect, the policy meant the provincial
government did not fund abortions as no hospitals in PEI performed them,76 and women had to
travel off the Island to access services.77
In 1994 the province’s Health & Community Services Agency crafted regulation 2(a.2)(iv)
under the provinces Health Services Payment Act.78 The section defined “basic health services”
as, “(iv) services provided in respect of termination of pregnancy performed in a hospital when the
condition of the patient is such that the service is determined by the Agency to be medically
required.”79 Dr. Morgentaler once more returned to court, challenging the regulation by asserting
that it was, “made for an unauthorized purpose and not in pursuit of the Agency's mandate of
operating a health services payment plan for the residents of this province.”80 Further, Morgentaler
asserted the regulation was beyond the scope of the authority of the enabling Act and further, was
inconsistent with the Canada Health Act.81
In 1995, the PEI Supreme Court sided with Morgentaler, finding the regulation was not
authorized under the Act and was beyond the mandate of the Health and Community Services
Agency. Further the Court noted the regulation was, “contradictory to and inconsistent with the
objects and purposes of the parent legislation.”82 Explaining its judgment the court said, “[t]here
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is no apparent reason rationally related to the administration of the provincial health payment plan
for limiting payment to abortions where the Agency in its discretion determines that the condition
of the patient is such that the service is medically required.”83 However, the following year the
judgment was overturned by the PEI Court of Appeal as the appeal court found the Act specifically
contemplated the government’s ability to determine what is medically required, making it intra
vires.84 The Court of Appeal found the Act authorized the agency to determine what services would
be paid for under the provincial health insurance plan noting the definition of “basic health
services” in section 1 to be, “all services rendered by physicians that in the opinion of the
agency are medically required.”85 “Thus, by virtue of definition,” the Court wrote, “a physician's
services, whether in respect of abortion or anything else, do not constitute ‘basic health services’
so as to qualify for payment of benefits under s. 3 unless the Agency considers them medically
necessary and unless they meet the conditions and limitations prescribed in the Regulations.”86
Following Morgentaler’s challenge, the restriction on funding and the failure to create
abortion access on the Island lasted for years. Joanna Erdman notes that it was not until 2016 that
there was substantial movement for increased access to abortion on the Island. The premier at the
time, Wade MacLauchlan, announced a revision to the former policy that would allow for
abortions to be performed on the Island, and plans to “open a hospital-based reproductive health
clinic on the Island.”87 PEI began performing abortions in province in 2017. According to the
Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), in 2016 PEI performed zero abortions but 162
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of the women who accessed abortion in other provinces and territories were residents of PEI.88 In
contrast, in 2017 the Island reported performing 147 abortions and 170 women who accessed a
reported abortion elsewhere in Canada were residents of PEI.89 According to the CIHI’s most
recent published data, in 2019 PEI performed 234 abortions in hospital, zero in clinic and 225 of
the reported abortions elsewhere in Canada were for residents of the Island.90 Clearly access has
increased dramatically on the Island, however as this thesis will discuss later, the province still
ranks as one of the lowest for abortions performed per capita. In 2021, PEI’s Health Services
Payment Act Regulations still contain a funding barrier in that they deem insured basic health
services to include “services provided in respect of termination of pregnancy,” if performed in
hospital.91
B. 1993 – 2021 Nova Scotia and R v Morgentaler (1993)
A year after the 1988 Morgentaler judgment the provincial government in Nova Scotia
enacted three regulations which, similar to the previous criminal prohibition, faced a constitutional
reckoning in R v Morgentaler (1993).92 The regulations were commonly referred to as the March
regulations, one was enacted under the province’s Health Services and Insurance Act,93 and two
identical regulations were enacted under the province’s Hospitals Act94 and the Health Act.95 The
regulations under the Hospitals Act and the Health Act prohibited performing abortions in any
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location other than an approved hospital under the Act.96 Anyone in contravention of prohibition
was guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction for a fine of not less than 10,000
dollars.97 The regulation under the Health Services and Insurance Act denied funding for abortions
performed outside of hospitals.98 In 1989 Dr. Morgentaler, ignoring the Nova Scotia legislation,
performed 14 abortions in the province. At the same time, Nova Scotia’s provincial government
introduced new legislation, the Medical Services Act, which (together with the Medical Services
Designation Regulation99 made thereunder) in effect amalgamated the previous prohibitions under
one Act and simultaneously repealed the March regulations.100 Dr. Morgentaler was then charged
with 14 counts of “unlawfully performing a designated medical service, to wit, an abortion, other
than in a hospital approved as such under the Hospitals Act, contrary to s. 6 of the Medical Services
Act.”101
At trial, Morgentaler did not dispute that he performed the abortions and violated the
regulations but once more challenged the prohibitions, arguing they were ultra vires the
jurisdiction of the provincial government. He argued the prohibitions were in pith and substance
criminal law and therefore under federal jurisdiction.102 The final judgment, delivered by the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1993, agreed with Morgentaler. The court found the provincial
legislation in essence was a prohibition of abortion with penal consequences, calling them a
reproduction of the now defunct section 251 of the Criminal Code.103 The court recognized the
objective of the legislation to be, “suppressing the perceived public harm or evil of abortion
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clinics,”104 and that “any concern with the safety and security of pregnant women or with health
care policy, hospitals or the regulation of the medical profession was merely ancillary.”105
Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority and drawing from the Court’s previous
Morgentaler judgment, once more reiterated the problematic nature of in-hospital requirements
for performing abortions. He wrote, “women may not wish to have an abortion in a hospital for
any number of legitimate reasons. Clearly restrictions as to place can have the effect of restricting
abortions in practice, and indeed it was the operation of s. 251 of the Criminal Code in restricting
abortions to certain hospitals that contributed largely to its demise.” 106 Sopinka J found the inhospital requirements to be one of the leading barriers which contributed to the previous Criminal
Code scheme’s demise. Sopinka J wrote, “the in-hospital requirement in that section led to
unacceptable delays, undue stress and trauma, and a severe practical restriction of access to
abortion services.”107
The Court, however, did not speak to the prohibition on funding under section 5 of the
province’s Medical Services Act, as the court stated, “no argument was directed toward the ‘deinsurance’ section in this Court,”108 leaving the funding barrier unaddressed.109Although the deinsurance regulations were not argued in Morgentaler’s challenge, they were enabled by the
prohibition on performing abortions outside of hospitals as section 5 denied funding for services
performed in contravention of the other two regulations. As those two regulations were found by
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the Supreme Court to be ultra vires the provincial government’s jurisdiction and therefore
unconstitutional, although section 5 was left unaddressed, it was effectively moot.
Following the 1993 Morgentaler decision, Nova Scotia’s provincial government continued
to refuse to fully fund abortions performed in clinics. Up until 2003, Dr. Morgentaler continued to
operate an abortion clinic in Nova Scotia. According to Hansards from the Nova Scotia
Legislature, the provincial government covered the cost of physician fees for performing the
service, that is the fee billed by the doctor for their service. All other costs associated with the
procedure, referred to as clinic fees, were uninsured.110 However, there is no apparent or reported
legal authority for this denial. Further, as discussed later, charging clinic fees is considered to be
extra-billing and in contravention of the Canada Health Act. As a result, they were later subject to
deductions from the Canada Health Transfer of approximately $370,000.111 When the clinic closed
in 2003, management cited the availability of free-of-charge abortions in hospital as one of reasons
for the closure. Clinic users were required to pay out-of-pocket as the provincial government was
still failing to fully fund abortions performed in clinic.112 Since this time, no private abortion clinic
has operated in Nova Scotia.
C. 1988 – 2021 New Brunswick’s Regulation 84-20
Since the 1988 Morgentaler judgment, New Brunswick has seen more abortion related
litigation than any other Canadian province and remains a pivotal legal battle ground for access to
abortion. Following the judgment in Morgentaler, New Brunswick enacted Regulation 84-20 of
the Medical Services Payment Act, defunding abortion services in the province unless performed
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by a specialist in obstetrics or gynecology, in an approved hospital, and with certification from
two medical professionals that it was “medically required.”113 In 1994 Dr. Morgentaler opened an
abortion clinic in Fredericton and was shortly after restrained by “Order of the Council of the
College of Physicians and Surgeons from performing abortions outside a hospital”114 contrary to
then sections 56 (b.1) and 56.2 of the province’s Medical Act. The Act enabled physicians to be
found guilty of misconduct if they performed abortions outside of hospitals.115
In June of 1994 Dr. Morgentaler performed five abortions at his clinic in Fredericton.116 In
response to a complaint from the provincial Minister of Health, on July 5th,1994 the Council of the
College of Physicians and Surgeons imposed restrictions on Morgentaler’s license and appointed
a board of inquiry.117 Morgentaler then launched a legal challenge asserting the provisions of the
Act were ultra vires the authority of the provincial government as they were in pith and substance,
criminal law.118 Later that year, a provincial court sided with Morgentaler. The court found the
legislation was enacted, “not with a view to controlling or ensuring the quality and nature of health
care or the maintenance of professional standards, but to prohibit abortions outside hospitals with
a view to suppressing or punishing what the members of the government and of the Legislative
Assembly perceived to be the socially undesirable conduct of abortion.”119The court found the
specific provisions to be in pith and substance criminal law, making them outside the provincial
government’s jurisdiction and Morgentaler reopened his Fredericton clinic.120 The province
appealed the lower court’s judgment but at the Court of Appeal the judgment was upheld.121
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In 2004 Dr. Morgentaler subsequently brought another legal challenge to the Medical
Services Payment Act’s prohibition on abortion funding. The case was ongoing for years, in part
due to the province’s unsuccessful attempt at challenging Dr. Morgentaler’s standing. Rachael
Johnstone and Emmett Macfarlane speak of New Brunswick’s lengthy record of legal challenges
over regulation 84-20 following the 1988 Supreme Court judgment. According to Johnstone and
Macfarlane, “the amendment was the subject of legal proceedings in the province until
Morgentaler’s death in 2013 brought the case to a close.”122 In 2014, a year after Dr. Morgentaler’s
death, the newly elected Liberal government slightly amended regulation 84-20. According to
Johnstone, “[a]lthough the regulation is still in place, the requirement that a specialist must perform
abortions is gone, and women no longer require written permission from two doctors to access
services.”123 Regulation 84-20 still deemed, and does to this day, abortion not to be an entitled
service unless “performed in a hospital facility approved by the jurisdiction in which the hospital
facility is located.”124 However, later that same year, Morgentaler’s Fredericton Clinic shut its
doors due to lack of provincial funding.125
In 2015, Clinic 554 opened in the old Fredericton Morgentaler Clinic. The clinic operated
unfunded by the provincial government for years, requiring patients to pay for abortions out-ofpocket, ranging between $700 and $850 depending on gestational term.126 In March of 2020, the
federal government withheld $140,000 from the federal health transfer to New Brunswick, citing
the funding restrictions being in violation of the Canada Health Act. However, the money was
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subsequently returned, due to the Covid-19 pandemic.127 Similarly to its predecessor, Clinic 554
was placed up for sale in 2020 due to lack of provincial funding.128 On January 8, 2021 the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) filed a notice of action with statement of claim
commencing legal proceedings against the New Brunswick government, challenging regulation
84-20.129 The CCLA’s statement of claim challenges the regulation on a number of grounds,
including an assertion that the legislation is ultra vires the provincial government’s authority as it
is in pith and substance, criminal law.130 The claim also requests a declaration that regulation 8420 is inconsistent with and in violation of the Canada Health Act, as well that the regulation is of
no force or effect as it is in violation of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.131 As of August 2021,
the CCLA’s legal challenge is currently ongoing.
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CHAPTER 2 - BARRIERS TO ACCESSING ABORTION IN 2021
More than 30 years after the landmark 1988 Supreme Court judgment numerous barriers
remain in accessing abortion in Canada, similar to those documented in the 1977 Badgley Report.
Although abortion is no longer criminalized, it is far from accessible in many areas of the country.
Similar to the abortion scheme documented in the Badgley report, barriers in access still include
lack of physical access to hospitals offering the service, financial barriers, misinformation, and
time constraints. Canada’s Maritime provinces still continue to have unique barriers to access and
some of the most problematic access frameworks in the country. While this thesis will specifically
examine the constitutionality of insurance restrictions on abortion, it is important to discuss the
numerous other barriers to access, as all of the barriers are intersecting, at times exacerbating each
other. Further understanding what populations are accessing abortion and how, helps us to
understand the true impact of current provincial regulation. Additional restrictions discussed
include: gestational limits; lack of physical access; limited access to information resources; as well
as the additional barriers unique to abortions performed in hospital, as opposed to clinic.
Before continuing, it is important to note that there is little reported and published statistical
information on abortion in Canada. Statistics Canada stopped gathering and reporting information
on abortion in 2006.132 At that time, the task was passed to the authority of the CIHI. The CIHI
gathers information on abortions from the provincial and territorial ministries of health as well as
hospitals and independent clinics.133 However, data from private clinics is submitted voluntarily
and therefore does not accurately reflect how many abortions are performed in clinics or who is
accessing those clinics.134 For example, in both Manitoba and Ontario the province only reports
132
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clinic abortions that are funded by the provincial government, which are estimated based on Fee
For Service charges. In both of those provinces all unfunded abortions are unreported.135
The CIHI collects broad demographic data of the reported abortions such as age bracket of
patients, province of residence, gestational age, complications, previous abortions, method of
procedure, and previous deliveries. Ontario clinics do not report abortions if the patient is under
the age of 25.136 However, we can see from the data collected by the CIHI, the majority of abortions
performed in all other provinces and territories across the country are for patients in the 18 to 24
age bracket.137 Younger adult populations are more likely to access abortion than older, making it
more likely patients are lower income.138 The CIHI also breaks down the statistics for each
province, allowing for a geographical analysis. For example, we can see that per capita, the
Maritime provinces perform the lowest number of abortions of any of the Canadian provinces, not
including the territories. Taking the territories into account, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia still
perform the lowest number of abortions per capita, with the Yukon coming in third and PEI moving
to fourth place. In addition, New Brunswick’s previous clinic abortions, prior to the closure of
Clinic 554, were reported to the CIHI. In 2019 the province reported 98 clinic abortions.139 Based
on the statistics of reported abortions, Ontario performs almost three times as many abortions per
capita as New Brunswick, not including the numerous unreported clinic abortions in Ontario.140
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I. Lack of Physical Access to Abortion Clinics due to Limited Service
Providers
Physical access to abortion providers across the country is limited and the lack of access
disproportionately impacts northern and rural populations. According to a publication from the
Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada (ARCC), less than 17 per cent of all Canadian hospitals
perform abortions,141 and some provinces and territories have no abortion clinics.142 Abortion
service providers are often located in southern areas of the country and around urban centres,
making it difficult for rural and northern populations to access services.143 According to Action
Canada, the majority of providers are located less than 150 kilometres from the Canada / US
border.
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decreased by 2 per cent. Of the 127 hospital mergers between 1990 and 1998, 50 percent resulted
in the elimination of some reproductive services.”146 Rachael Johnstone says limitations in service
providers are also, in part, due to reluctance on the part of medical professionals to perform
abortions. According to Johnstone, many doctors are hesitant to perform abortions due to fear of
harassment or violence.147 Jocelyn Downie and Carla Nassar say of those willing to perform
abortions, many do not live in rural areas and that most who do live in urban centres.148
With the announced closure of Clinic 554, there are now no abortion clinics across the
Maritime provinces. Residents of PEI can access abortion within their home province only at one
location, the Prince County Hospital in Summerside.149 In Nova Scotia, there are access points in
Halifax, Bridgewater, Truro, and Kentville.150 However, there is no access point for the 132,000
people living on Cape Breton Island,151 meaning the residents’ closest access point would be in
Truro, a seven-hour round-trip drive from Sydney, Nova Scotia. In New Brunswick, two hospitals
in Moncton perform abortions and one hospital in Bathurst. There is now no access point in the
province’s capital city Fredericton, following the closure of Clinic 554. Further, according to the
statement of claim filed by the CCLA, the hospital in Bathurst will only accept patients from the
Bathurst area, meaning all other provincial residents must travel to Moncton.152 According to the
CCLA, this means residents living in Edmundston would be required to make an eight-hour return
trip by car in order to access the service. The CCLA notes numerous issues with these limitations
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in access, stating that it would often require an overnight stay, two days off work, along with a
support individual to accompany the woman on the trip, as hospitals require patients be
accompanied by a support individual.153 In addition, financial resources are required to cover
expenses for the entire trip.154

II. Gestational Limits
Gestational limits vary widely across the country depending on the institution. There are
often no provincial guidelines or parameters on setting limits, they are determined by the specific
institution. The one access point in PEI will only perform abortions up until 12 weeks of
pregnancy. 155 In Nova Scotia, the Halifax provider offers abortion up until 15 weeks of pregnancy,
but all other provincial providers have a 12 week gestational limit.156 In New Brunswick, women
can access abortion up until 13 weeks and 6 days of pregnancy.157 In contrast, women in Alberta
can access abortion up until 20 weeks, in British Columbia until 23 weeks, and Ontario until 24
weeks.158 Joanna Erdman concludes that gestational age is an “arbitrary means of regulating access
to abortion and thereby runs afoul of human rights protection.”159 The lack of consistency in
gestational limit between institutions and provinces appears to support Erdman's claim.
According to the “Induced Abortion Guidelines” published in the Society of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists of Canada’s Clinical Practice Guidelines, although there is increased risk of
hemorrhage during pregnancy later in the second gestational term, “both medical termination and
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dilatation and evacuation (D&E) are safe and effective methods of uterine evacuation in the second
trimester.”160 It is evident that abortions can be safely performed in the second trimester as many
institutions will do so. Therefore begging the question, why do certain institutions choose to
restrict the gestational limit to the first trimester or earlier? Erdman argues, “[t]he ethical dilemmas
of abortion are most pronounced, philosophically and publicly, later in pregnancy.”161 Erdman
refers to the limits as “boundary crossing” in abortion law, where the moral, as opposed to medical,
implications are the governing force. According to Erdman, this “presents significant problems for
women’s access to care and for the legitimacy of the law in regulating access, insofar as it masks
moral judgment in medical discretion.”162

III. Lack of Data
As mentioned earlier, there is limited information regarding access to abortion in Canada,
consequently the full extent of the Maritime provinces’ access problem is unknown. What
statistical data does exist from the CIHI does not fully represent the numbers, as clinic abortions
are reported on a voluntary basis. However, only one clinic in the Maritime provinces has been in
operation in the last decade, Clinic 554, which reported the number of abortions it performed to
the CIHI. Therefore, the statistical information in the Maritime provinces is likely more accurate,
as compared to other provinces with unreported clinic abortions, such as Ontario, Manitoba, and
Québec. In the Maritime provinces, the limited access to abortion clinics means there are no
unreported clinics and therefore no unreported clinic abortions, enabling more comprehensive
understanding of the numbers of abortions performed in the province.
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In contrast, accessing reliable information on abortion services, including the procedure,
administrative issues, and regulation within each of the Maritime provinces is exceedingly
difficult. There is limited information on the access framework, where the nearest providers are
located, how much the procedure costs if not insured, lengths of wait times, and what is insured
under the provincial health insurance frameworks. Erin Nelson says this is the case for
reproductive health data in general, noting that “there is almost no Canadian data available that
would provide a clear picture of how accessible reproductive health services actually are.”163
Rachel Johnstone and Emmett Macfarlane call the lack of information available another
bureaucratic hoop to jump through in accessing abortion. Further, according to Johnstone and
Macfarlane, “[w]hat data is available on these arrangements is not readily accessible, and neither
is it comprehensive.”164 Nelson, as well as Johnstone and Macfarlane, also observe that what little
there is, has been documented by activist groups or not-for-profit organizations.165 According to
Johnstone, no nation-wide study on access to abortion has been commissioned since the 1977
Badgley Report.166
These issues are exemplified in what supporting information has informed this thesis, as
the majority is informed by publications from not-for-profit organizations. Issues of transparency
are also clear when attempting to access information on health insurance funding for abortion in
Nova Scotia. Currently there is no abortion clinic in Nova Scotia, but it remains somewhat unclear
as to whether one would be funded if it were to open. There is currently no published policy
regarding abortion funding in Nova Scotia. However, as discussed earlier, following the 1993
Morgentaler judgment the provincial government continued to refuse to fully fund clinic abortions
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up until the early 2000s when the Morgentaler Clinic shut its doors. The legal authority for this
denial is also not known.
In 2021, according to a report published by the Halifax branch of the Women’s Legal
Education Action Fund (LEAF), there are currently no legislative prohibitions on the funding of
abortion clinics. However, according to the report, there remain disincentives for opening a clinic
in the province. These include, according to the LEAF report, that while “the provincial health
plan covers the cost of abortions performed at hospitals in Nova Scotia for all individuals registered
with MSI (Medical Services Insurance) in the province,” it does not cover the cost of clinic
abortions.167 Similar findings are reported from the National Abortion Federation and the Halifax
Sexual Health Centre which both report that Nova Scotia funds abortions performed in hospitals.168
MSI’s website and their insured services brochure provide no information on the funding of
abortion in the province.169 There also appears to be no information on any government website or
in any of the province’s health legislation or accompanying regulations. Due to lack of government
reporting and transparency, there is no definitive answer to the funding question in Nova Scotia,
including whether abortions are fully unfunded or whether the cost of only the physician fee is
insured, as it was under the former Morgentaler Clinic. However, it is likely that similar to the
former Morgentaler Clinic, if an abortion clinic were to operate in Nova Scotia it would be either
partially or fully unfunded by the MSI plan.
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IV. Hospital Specific Barriers
According to the CIHI, clinics perform the majority of abortions in Canada. This is
notwithstanding many provinces and territories do not have abortion clinics and reporting of clinic
abortions to the CIHI is voluntary. The limited statistics available demonstrate a preference for
abortions performed in clinics despite their lack of availability in certain areas. According to the
CIHI, in 2019 clinics performed 58,724 of the 83,576 reported abortions in Canada.170 According
to Downie and Nassar, women cite a preference for a clinic abortion, “because they perceive the
environment to be more supportive, the staff or techniques to be more expert, or privacy to be
better maintained.”171 According to the statement of claim filed by the CCLA, in New Brunswick
the former Morgentaler clinic performed 60 per cent of the province’s abortions before it closed.172
In addition, another reason that clinics are at times preferable is that hospitals have unique
barriers which can make services even more inaccessible. According to a report from ARCC,
hospitals often have shorter gestational limits and can be more costly when service is uninsured.
ARCC notes hospital charges can range up to, “$1,425 or more (depending on the province)”.173
Hospitals often have longer waitlists, at times up to six to eight weeks long, according to ARCC.174
Further, there are differences in the procedure, many hospitals use general anaesthesia – as opposed
to local – making the procedure more lengthy and increasing potential risks.175 Lastly, hospitals
often require a doctor’s referral, an additional step in the process which is not accessible to all.
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Downie and Nassar say obtaining a referral can be difficult for women who do not have a primary
care physician or have one who is opposed to abortion. 176 In Canada, the conscientious objection
policy allows doctors to refuse to treat patients based on religious beliefs. According to ARCC,
Ontario is the only province that requires “effective referral” to a provider or agency that is able
to perform the service.177 ARCC also notes that in the Maritime provinces, New Brunswick and
PEI require referral for information but it is not an effective referral as required in Ontario, as the
referral is for information only and not the performance of the service.178

V. Health Insurance Restrictions
Each of the Maritime provinces has unique restrictions on health insurance funding for
abortion, either legislative or policy based. New Brunswick’s regulation 84-20 under the
province’s Medical Services Payment Act,179 discussed earlier, still contains the problematic
provision that Dr. Morgentaler challenged almost 20 years ago. Schedule 2 of the regulation deems
specific procedures “not to be entitled services” including “abortion, unless the abortion is
performed in a hospital facility approved by the jurisdiction in which the hospital facility is
located.”180 PEI’s regulations under the province’s Health Services Payment Act define insured
“basic health services” as “services provided in respect of termination of pregnancy performed in
a hospital.”181 As noted earlier, Nova Scotia’s policy for funding of abortion services outside of
hospitals is unclear. The province currently has no clinic and no regulatory prohibition on funding,

176

Downie & Nassar, supra note 148 at 4.
“Position Paper #95 The Refusal to Provide Health Care in Canada” (October 2020) at 1, online (pdf): Abortion
Rights Coalition of Canada <www.arcc-cdac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/95-refusal-to-provide-healthcare.pdf>.
178
Ibid.
179
Medical Services Payment Act, RSNB 1973, c M-7.
180
NB Reg 1984-20, Schedule 2, (a.1).
181
PEI Reg EC499/13 s 1(c)(iv).
177

35

but numerous sources report that the province’s provincial health plan does not provide
comprehensive funding for clinic abortions. This was the case when the previous provincial clinic
was in operation. Therefore, as noted earlier, it is likely that if a clinic did open it would go either
fully or partially unfunded, similar to the former Morgentaler Clinic.
Interprovincial billing is another issue for the funding of clinic abortions across the country.
Interprovincial billing is part of the CHA’s portability requirement. Under the CHA, provincial
health insurance plans must provide payments for insured services while a resident is temporarily
absent from the province, either in another province or outside of the country, subject to certain
limitations.182 Bilateral agreements for interprovincial billing between the provinces facilitate
payment and regulate the administration of interprovincial billing.183 Representatives from each
provincial health body make up the Interprovincial Health Insurance Agreements Coordinating
Committee which determines, among other things, what rates can be charged and what services
are covered when a resident is out of province.184
Until 2015 abortions were listed in the Excluded Services Regulations for interprovincial
billing, meaning for women who had to travel to access abortion prior to 2015, such as those in
PEI, the service was unfunded unless prior arrangements had been made between the home and
visiting province. Documents obtained from Health Canada through an Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy request show policy discussions involved in the 2015 change acknowledged
the previous restriction was in violation of the portability requirements under Canada Health
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Act.185 In 2015 the Interprovincial Health Insurance Agreements Coordinating Committee quietly
removed abortion from the excluded services regulations.186
Although the excluded service regulation was amended, without clear and transparent
government acknowledgement or discussion on the issue, many remain confused as to the
implications of the change. ARCC reports the change means, “women and transgender people can
now obtain fully funded abortions at the point of service when they are living or travelling out of
province.”187 Rachel Johnstone says, “fortunately for women in need of care, abortion was quietly
removed from the list of prohibited services in 2015.”188 But Erin Nelson says this is only a partial
victory and “only abortion services provided in a hospital are covered and, as noted earlier, the
vast majority of Canadian hospitals do not offer abortion services.189 An info bulletin from the
Health Services Branch of the Ontario Government dated September 8, 2015 states, “claims for
medically/therapeutically necessary abortions rendered to out-of-province residents at a publicly
funded hospital that can bill reciprocally should be submitted through the reciprocal hospital
billing system using service code 02 (Day Care Surgery) unless the patient is an admitted in-patient
in which case the hospital’s per diem rate applies.”190 According to this bulletin, abortion will be
insured

interprovincially

if

performed

in

a

publicly

funded

hospital

and

be

“medically/therapeutically necessary.”
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Considering the above-mentioned barriers, restrictions on clinic funding are clearly
problematic. Refusal to fund clinic abortions not only requires women to pay for services out-ofpocket but it also disincentivizes the operation of clinics in the province, further limiting access.
In addition, as previously discussed, all previous clinics which have operated in the Maritime
provinces have been forced to close their doors due to lack of funding. Therefore, even the twotiered system existing within the Maritime provinces which emerges from the funding denial
ultimately collapses into itself. Clinics are integral to ensuring effective and meaningful access to
abortions. Not only because women tend to prefer clinics but because clinics are often more
accessible, have later gestational limits, shorter wait times, and no referral requirements. Further,
by refusing to fund clinic abortions, governments are effectively refusing to fund abortions
performed after the first trimester.
The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged on two occasions that in-hospital
requirements are arbitrary restrictions which can be found in violation of the Charter.191 Refusing
to fund clinic abortions in effect, has the same outcome. It forces women to access abortions in
hospital either because they are unable to afford private clinic abortions or because there are no
local clinic access points as they were unable to maintain operation without government funding.
Clinics are a meaningful component of the framework for access to abortion in Canada, enabling
a more accessible market for women across the country. It is clear from the per capita data on
abortion access in Canada, as discussed at the beginning of this Chapter, that provinces with larger
access frameworks which fund clinic abortions, perform more abortions. Creating barriers to clinic
funding limits access to abortion as fewer providers will open and offer services and fewer
abortions will be performed.

191

See Morgentaler 1993, supra note 92 at 84 and see also Morgentaler 1988, supra note 1 at 153.

38

VI. A Privatized Market
As discussed, following the decriminalization of abortion, each of the Maritime provinces
made attempts to restrict the provision of abortion in their provinces. This was achieved, either by
restricting insurance funding or attempting to prohibit the delivery of the service. However as
demonstrated by the jurisprudence, any attempts to restrict the actual delivery of the service were
met with pith and substance legal challenges – such as the 1993 challenge in Nova Scotia. Sarah
Birmingham discusses this trend and notes that in response, provinces attempted to restrict access
using frameworks under their own jurisdiction. “Provincial governments are not entirely precluded
from enacting laws with a moral cast or gleam, but they must be rooted in a section 92 head of
power,”192 Birmingham writes. For abortion, this means “the most obvious candidates are the
provincial health care powers, namely protection of women’s health, regulation of hospitals or the
medical profession, or provision of safe, cost-effective medical services.”193 Therefore,
Birmingham asserts that provincial regulation of abortion must in pith and substance deal with one
of these jurisdictional heads: “[a]n inquiry into the validity of abortion regulation will usually turn
on whether the provincial law is truly aimed at one of these objectives.”194
Thus, provinces have often chosen to limit abortion by allowing the provision of services
but then placing restrictions on funding the service in order to make it less accessible.195 The
provincial governments are then able to claim jurisdictional control, arguing the restrictions are
not fundamentally about morality but instead fall within provincial jurisdiction. This is done by
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asserting the regulations are concerned with allocating limited resources for health care, concerned
with promoting health and safety through regulation, or maintaining and regulating a public health
care system. Speaking to the bureaucratic restrictions on health insurance funding, Johnstone says,
“[i]t is evident that these roadblocks are not motivated by a desire to create improved health care
for women, but to block access to what is portrayed as an immoral and undesirable procedure.”196
As a result of insurance barriers, a privatized market of abortion has emerged following R v
Morgentaler. This means for some women seeking to access abortion, it is available but at a high
cost. This includes women who need abortion services after 12 weeks, women who do not live
near one of the few hospital access points, and women who do not realize they are pregnant in time
to join a waiting list before reaching the hospital’s gestational limit.
Sanda Rogers argues that privatization results, in part, from failings in the public sector.
Rogers writes, “access to abortion services is so compromised in the public sector that private
clinics have increased access for some women in some provinces – mainly women with financial
resources – who are disproportionately white, middle class, educated women living in urban
areas.”197 However, Erdman says the two-tiered scheme is nothing new, speaking to the previous
access framework enabled under former section 251 of the Criminal Code. She writes, “the
‘therapeutic reserve’ in abortion funding regulation clearly reflected the logic of the 1969 criminal
law, which created two categories of abortion: publicly supported therapeutic care and illegal
private market transactions.”198 Under the previous scheme, Erdman says approval from TACs
was more accessible to privileged populations. She writes, “(m)arried, white, middle class women,
who could afford a family physician of good standing, fared better in approvals – especially if
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willing or able to bear the label of “mentally unstable” in their medical records.”199 Erdman says
the previous 1969 reform, “was formal sanction of a class-based system of abortion access.”200
According to Erdman, the 1988 Morgentaler judgment did little to address this imbalance.
She maintains that the “Morgentaler 1988 judgment did not disturb these categories, but rather reinscribed them onto the logic of Charter rights.”201 She voices similar sentiments to Johnstone and
Rogers saying that post-Morgentaler, access to abortion is available to those who can afford it.
She writes, “in this liberal tradition, the constitutionalizing of abortion not only decriminalized the
market in abortion services, it affirmed a competitive private market as the means of rights
fulfillment, and thereby acceded to its rationalities and inequalities.”202 Erdman says reforms postMorgentaler not only failed to ensure social equality in access, they provided women with “the
freedom to seek abortion as a private commodity in a newly decriminalized market.”203 Erdman’s
commentary is relevant across the country, especially in regards to rural and remote populations
as limited access throughout the provinces in non-urban centres requires certain populations to
travel for service making it more accessible for those who can afford it. However, her commentary
is particularly relevant for the Maritime provinces where increased insurance restrictions further
exacerbate the disparities in access for low-income populations who are unable to afford clinic
abortions in a private market or to travel long distances. Restrictions on clinic funding limit access
to clinics by disincentivizing their operation, creating fewer service providers for abortion service
and narrowing the access framework. As discussed, when in operation, the Maritime clinics
charged a fee for service (in New Brunswick the full fee, in Nova Scotia a portion of the fee)
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requiring women to pay for the service out-of-pocket, meaning only those who can afford abortion
can access it at the clinic.
Although in 2021 abortion is no longer criminalized, it is far from accessible in the
Maritime provinces. As discussed, insurance prohibitions on clinic funding enable a two-tiered
system for access, disproportionately impacting low-income populations who cannot to pay for
abortion out-of-pocket or take days off work to travel across, or out of, the province for access.
Further, although problematic in and of itself, the two-tiered system is unsustainable. As
demonstrated historically in the Maritime provinces, private clinics are unable to maintain
operation without government funding. Although barriers in access exist across the country, as a
result of the ban on clinic funding in the Maritime provinces, clinic abortions can only operate in
a privatized market which has, historically, led to clinic closures and narrowing access schemes.
All of the clinics which have existed at one point in the Maritime provinces have closed, with the
majority of them citing lack of funding as the cause204
Therefore, even the problematic two-tiered abortion access framework within the Maritime
provinces, in some ways effectively collapses into itself. Historically, without provincial funding
clinics have been unable to operate collapsing the two-tiered framework within the province. This
effectively forces women to either access abortion through a hospital within their individual
province or travel for service, which only those with financial means can afford. As women with
financial means are able to access clinic abortion service by travelling and paying for the
interprovincial clinic abortion out-of-pocket, hallmarks of the two-tiered framework remain. In
addition, the Maritime provinces have some of the most inflexible access frameworks with fewer
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access points, tighter gestational limits, and additional bureaucratic hoops to jump through when
seeking an in-hospital abortion. The additional barriers further exacerbate the impact felt by
Maritime women on clinic insurance funding. Because of this, it is even more important to
guarantee clinic funding in the Maritime provinces in order to ensure effective and meaningful
access to abortion.
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CHAPTER 3 – ADDRESSING THE BARRIERS
While seeking to address the contemporary limitations in access to abortion in Canada,
more recent legal scholarship has predominantly focused on two approaches to addressing the
issue legally. The first approach is in human rights law and looks to the constitutionality of the
current access scheme. This approach examines the issue through the lens of sections 7 and 15 of
the Charter, arguing that the government’s failure to ensure access to abortion across the country
is in violation of its positive rights obligations. While Canadian jurisprudence demonstrates a
willingness on the part of Canadian courts to find access to abortion claims engage the Charter’s
section 7 guarantee to life, liberty, and security of person, it has done so through negative rights
claims.205 However, more recently, discussions on the topic also examine the issue through the
equality guarantees of section 15, as abortion is a gendered issue.206 The second approach to
challenging access involves examining the issue through the lens of Canadian health law and
principles of Canadian Medicare. This approach argues that the failure to ensure access to abortion
services is in violation of the Canada Health Act and is therefore subject to the remedies under the
Act. Advocates for this approach claim the provision of abortion in Canada is inconsistent with the
five mandatory criteria outlined in the CHA. In addition, they argue provinces allowing or
mandating private billing of abortion procedures by means of uninsured clinic fees, violates the
CHA’s ban on extra-billing.207
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I.

Health Law
Martha Jackman advocates for a multi-faceted argument encompassing both approaches.

Jackman advocates for a human rights approach to healthcare, as she says it creates two
enforcement mechanisms.208 Jackman maintains that the failure on the part of the federal,
provincial, and territorial governments to “to address individual and systemic barriers to abortion
within their respective jurisdictions,” is not only in violation of the Charter.209 Jackman argues it
is in contravention of the Canada Health Act, and it “would also directly infringe the right to
‘health care that is comprehensive, universal, portable, accessible, and publicly administered’
under section 1(b) of the Alternative Social Charter.”210 Jackman’s arguments are compelling,
however, as we will discuss in this section, the enforcement mechanisms in health law have
historically proven ineffective at remedying provincial barriers to abortions.
While arguments advanced through Canadian health law have their own inherent
obstacles, so too does the positive human rights claim. While the majority of recent human rights
discourse has centred on a positive rights approach to abortion access, historically, the Supreme
Court has demonstrated a reluctance to find positive rights violations under the Charter,
particularly in regard to section 7. In health law, the potential remedies for violations under the
CHA are seldom used and often ineffective in ensuring compliance with the Act. As a result, access
to abortion issues remain stagnant with major barriers to access remaining, particularly in Canada’s
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Maritime provinces. Below this thesis will examine the contemporary legal scholarship on the
issue and how access to abortion can be challenged through each framework. This thesis will also
discuss the inherent challenges in the proposed approaches leaving limited recourse for addressing
access issues, by way of a legal challenge, under these frameworks and will propose an alternative
approach.

A. Remedies under the Canada Health Act
One approach to challenging access to abortion comes through the remedies available in
Canadian health law. Erdman discusses the focus on health care claims as intertwined with those
of equality rights. According to Erdman, in response to the inequalities that emerged postMorgentaler, “feminist activists shifted discursive strategy and sought to rework the abortion right
to secure access and equality.”211 In doing so, Erdman says activists claimed, “all abortions are
therapeutic care, or in Canadian health care discourse, a ‘medically necessary’ service.”212 Erdman
notes the appeal of this claim is obvious, “[o]n reclassification as therapeutic care, abortion is fully
absorbed into the public health care system, to be treated and funded like every other health care
service.”213 Macfarlane also ties claims for abortion as a healthcare issue to equality rights claims.
“Along the lines of Eldridge,” Macfarlane writes, “the failure of some provinces to ensure ready
access to abortion services is a form of sex-based discrimination in the context of a state-funded
health care system operating on the principle of ensuring the provision of core medically-necessary
services regardless of the ability to pay.”214
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As discussed earlier, health jurisdiction in Canada is divided between the provincial and
federal governments. Although delivery and regulation of health care predominantly falls under
provincial jurisdiction, the federal government has jurisdiction over marine hospitals and
healthcare associated with a number of other jurisdictional heads, including Indigenous
populations and the military. In addition, the federal government maintains influence over
provincial health insurance via its spending power. This results from the structure of the Canadian
health care system, where provincial governments receive funding from the federal government
for health care through the Canada Health Transfer. The CHA establishes criteria and conditions
that the provincial governments must meet in order to receive their federal funding contribution.215
If the provinces fail to comply with the five program criteria, then the federal government can
deduct funding from the next year’s transfer. The authority for withholding contributions is under
section 15 of the CHA. Section 15 states if of the opinion that one of the provincial governments
has failed to comply with the criteria, the Governor in Council may “direct that any cash
contribution to that province for a fiscal year be reduced, in respect of each default, by an amount
that the Governor in Council considers to be appropriate, having regard to the gravity of the
default;”216 or, “where the Governor in Council considers it appropriate, direct that the whole of
any cash contribution to that province for a fiscal year be withheld.”217
As noted, the five program criteria under the CHA are universality, portability,
comprehensiveness, accessibility, and public administration. In order for the provincial health
insurance plans to meet the public administration criteria, the plans must be publicly run on a nonprofit basis.218 According to the CHA, the comprehensiveness criteria is satisfied if a province’s
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plan covers, “all insured health services provided by hospitals, medical practitioners or dentists,
and where the law of the province so permits, similar or additional services rendered by other
health care practitioners.”219 For universality, the health insurance plan of the province must,
“entitle one hundred per cent of the insured persons of the province to the insured health services
provided for by the plan on uniform terms and conditions.”220 The portability criteria requires that
provinces not impose a minimum residency requirement to be eligible for funding in excess of
three months and must cover residents’ non-elective services while temporarily absent from the
province or while moving to another province before they meet the three month criteria.221 Lastly,
the accessibility criterion mandates the provinces to create a health insurance system which has
uniform terms and conditions for all residents allowing for reasonable access, as well as insuring
physician and hospital services in accordance with a tariff system authorized by provincial law.222
Arguably, the current access scheme for abortion in the Maritime provinces violates all
five criteria under the CHA. Howard Palley speaks to how abortion access in Canada violates the
requirements of the CHA quoting a 2003 report from the Canadian Abortion Rights Action League
(CARAL). Quoting the CARAL report, he asserts that portability is violated when abortion is
excluded from interprovincial billing.223 As previously mentioned, although hospital abortions can
now be interprovincially billed, clinic abortions are still excluded. Next, Palley writes, accessibility
“is breached when provinces such as Prince Edward Island, refuse to provide any abortion services,
forcing women to travel to the mainland to receive care.”224 Although PEI now performs abortions,
it only does so up until the end of the first trimester and only at one location in the province.
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Comprehensiveness is breached, according to Palley, when provinces refuse to pay for a medically
necessary procedure performed at a free-standing clinic,225 such as pursuant to the insurance
restrictions in PEI, New Brunswick, and most likely in Nova Scotia.
Palley argues that the criteria for public administration is disregarded when, “as a result of
hospital mergers between Catholic and secular hospitals, the publicly funded Catholic-run
institutions eliminate all reproductive health care services for women, including contraception and
abortion.”226 Arguably, public administration is also breached when a province’s health insurance
plan fails to insure services outside hospitals. This limits the availability of abortions to the first
trimester and limits access. In effect this arrangement results in the creation of a two-tiered system
and the privatization of services in order to fill a sizeable gap in the system. Lastly, Palley asserts,
“the principle of universality is clearly meaningless when it comes to abortion because the
availability of hospital services can vary from 0% to 35% depending on where a woman lives.”227
The access framework in the Maritime provinces exemplifies this position. While abortions may
be reasonably accessible in the public system for women in the first trimester in Moncton, they are
virtually inaccessible for those in the second trimester in Edmundston.
Flood, Lahey, and Thomas assert, “the broad provisions of the CHA mean the federal
government has wide and virtually unreviewable discretion as to whether a province has complied
with any of its criteria and then, further, whether to penalize a province.”228 While all of these
violations of the CHA are occurring in the Maritime provinces in the context of abortion provision,
it is unlikely that the remedy under section 15 of the CHA will address the issue. This is due to the
federal government’s historical approach to remedying violations under the CHA. Despite
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numerous barriers to abortion existing for years across the Maritime provinces in violation of the
CHA, the enforcement mechanism under section 15 of the CHA has never been used.229
Section 15 of the CHA is not the only enforcement mechanism under the Act. Outside of
the program criteria, the CHA also contains a prohibition on extra-billing and enforcement
mechanisms to accompany the ban. Extra-billing is defined in the CHA as, “the billing for an
insured health service rendered to an insured person by a medical practitioner or a dentist in an
amount in addition to any amount paid or to be paid for that service by the health care insurance
plan of a province.”230 If provinces allow for extra-billing of patients, the CHA mandates the
federal government to deduct a dollar-for-dollar amount from the next year’s transfer.231 Sanda
Rogers notes the extra-billing prohibitions apply to clinic abortions not covered by provincial
plans. Discussing the remedy under the CHA she writes, “because abortion is a medically
necessary health care service, extra billing and user charges associated with it are the subject of
mandatory (dollar for dollar) penalties under the CHA.”232

B. Unpersuasive remedies and limited enforcement
One of the ways in which provinces escape enforcement or refuse funding of a service is
through claiming the service is not medically necessary and therefore is not covered under the
CHA and provincial health plans. The CHA mandates the funding of insured health services, the
definition of which includes medically necessary hospital services. Medically necessary hospital
services are defined as “medically necessary for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing
disease or diagnosing or treating an injury, illness or disability.”233 As Rachel Johnstone notes,
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“the Canada Health Act does not, however, provide a definition of medical necessity or, for that
matter, of health.”234 Johnstone says those who argue against the funding of abortion claim the
service is elective and not medically necessary. Johnstone writes, “they contend that abortion often
happens for social reasons rather than purely medical ones and should therefore not be considered
a required medical service.”235 However, to Johnstone, this argument fails to consider the wider
implications. She writes, “this critique depends on a narrow definition of health that seems to
exclude both mental health and social determinants of health.”236 Sanda Rogers and Howard Palley
both contend abortion is a medically necessary procedure. Palley writes, “[a]bortion is a procedure
that, in Canada, must be performed by a medical doctor, and it is a procedure that has been declared
a medically necessary one by all provincial/territorial colleges of physicians and surgeons.”237
Rogers says even though abortion is recognized as a medically necessary service, “many
[provinces] nonetheless limit their funding to specified parameters which often render access
illusory.”238
Flood, Lahey, and Thomas describe the federal enforcement mechanisms under the Act, as
a “carrot and stick approach to incentivize provinces to comply with national standards in their
respective public insurance plans.”239 They write, “[i]n theory, if provinces do not comply
with CHA criteria (e.g., related to preventing out-of-pocket billing of patients at point-of-service),
the federal government can in future years withhold funding from the offending province.”240
However, according to Flood, Lahey, and Thomas, the reality is that the enforcement provision for
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criteria violations is not used. According to them, “federal governments over the decades have
taken a lenient if not a permissive approach to enforcement.”241
Sanda Rogers agrees, and notes “the federal government has never demonstrated a
willingness to impose harsher penal ties on provinces which fail to comply with the principles of
Canadian health care.”242 However, in contrast, Rogers discusses the dollar-for-dollar enforcement
mechanism mandated for extra-billing by the CHA. Which, according to Flood, Lahey, and
Thomas, is the stronger of the two enforcement mechanisms, as the CHA mandates deductions for
violations resulting from extra-billing.243 The dollar-for-dollar deduction has been used on
multiple occasions to enforce extra-billing charges, including for clinic abortion fees.244 However,
Rogers does not think the mechanism is effective, especially when it comes to ensuring access to
abortion. She writes, “the provinces have been willing to forgo the minimal funds that the federal
government has withheld, rather than to address the issue of privatized health care services
generally or abortion in particular.”245 Palley discusses the use of the federal claw back power
regarding private clinic charges for abortions in Nova Scotia in the early 2000s. According to
Palley, in 2001-2002 the federal government withheld transfer payments to Nova Scotia in
response to facility fees not insured at the former Morgentaler Clinic.246 However, Palley says the
mechanism was ineffective. He writes, “the government of Nova Scotia, subject to bottom-up
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political pressure, indicated that it willingly would forgo the federal revenue rather than comply
with the federal interpretation of the requirement of the Canada Health Act.”247
One of the mechanisms for addressing conflicts in Canadian health law is the Dispute
Avoidance and Resolution (DAR) action. The DAR process was introduced in 2004 to encourage
cooperation between the provinces and the federal government during instances of non-compliance
with the CHA.248 According to Rachel Johnstone, the process is “launched in the event of
disagreements over the application of the Canada Health Act by different levels of government.”249
Johnstone says the process begins with a government-to-government fact finding negotiation but
the final authority to interpret the CHA lies with the federal health minister.250 According to
Johnstone, should the parties be unable to come to an agreement the non-compliance provisions
come into effect which allows for deductions from the Canada Health Transfer.251
In 2005 the federal health minister initiated a DAR process against New Brunswick for
failing to cover the cost of abortions in private clinics.252 Johnstone says New Brunswick’s
progressive conservative government’s health minister at the time, Elvy Robichaud, publicly
announced that the government would not bow to the pressure of the federal liberal government.253
According to Johnstone, before the process was completed an election was called and the federal
liberal government lost to Stephen Harper’s conservatives. Johnstone says the enforcement
mechanisms under the CHA depend on the “political will of federal governments to employ it.”254
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Shortly after the election, Johnstone says the Harper government announced it had no intention to
continue with the DAR enforcement process.255
As discussed earlier, the claw back enforcement mechanism for extra-billing has been used
in response to unfunded abortion services in New Brunswick at Clinic 554, with little success. In
March of 2020 federal Minister of Health Patty Hadju wrote to New Brunswick threatening a
funding clawback should the province fail to comply with the funding criteria under the CHA.256
The letter asserted patient charges for surgical abortions would be considered extra-billing and
user charges resulting in a claw back of the Canada Health Transfer.257 New Brunswick responded
to the threat by saying their position remained unchanged, clearly not deterred by the threat of
punishment. The federal government then withheld $140,126 dollars in transfer payments, the
amount corresponding to what New Brunswick women had been charged out-of-pocket for
abortions performed at Clinic 554.258 In context, New Brunswick’s entitlement under the Canada
Health Transfer for 2020-2021 was 860 million dollars.259 The withheld payment is clearly a
nominal amount in regards to federal contributions for New Brunswick’s health care funding.
However, as noted earlier, even the nominal amount was returned. According to CBC News,
shortly after the claw back was withheld, the federal government “quickly reinstated the funding
as New Brunswick's health-care system buckled under the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic.”260
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Not only are the enforcement remedies and mechanisms under the CHA rarely used and
ineffectual, they fail to properly address the issue. While the federal government may choose to
claw back $140,126 from New Brunswick as a deterrent, the money is only held with the federal
government. Not only is the enforcement mechanism unsuccessful in its objective, Canadian
women are still left short-changed. As discussed, those accessing abortion in Canada are
predominantly younger and therefore lower-income populations. The women who paid out-ofpocket for abortions at Clinic 554 are not reimbursed for their expenses. With this in mind one
must consider what objective this enforcement mechanism truly serves. Not only is it seemingly
futile, but it fails to truly grasp the crux of the issue.
Documents released by Health Canada under the Access to Information Act reveal another
inherent weakness in CHA remedies. The extra-billing enforcement mechanism under the CHA is
only available after the prohibition has been violated. In an email from August 2014 the Assistant
Director of Compliance and Interpretation of the Canada Health Act division, Ursula Scott, states
abortions are deemed medically necessary and that further, the CHA “requires that all medically
necessary physician and hospital services be covered by provincial/territorial health insurance
plans whether they are provided in hospital or in a facility providing hospital care.”261 The email
speaks to the limited recourse available, at the time, for enforcing compliance with the CHA after
the former Morgentaler clinic closed in Fredericton. According to the email, while clinic charges
under provincial legislation were in contravention of the extra-billing prohibition under the CHA,
little could be done. The email states, “the Fredericton clinic closure actually means that extrabilling and user charges penalties under the Act are no longer possible going forward.”262
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Therefore, as there is currently no abortion clinic operating in either PEI or Nova Scotia, remedies
for extra-billing are unavailable.

II.

A Positive Rights Approach
Since the decriminalization of abortion, scholarly discussion on the topic and feminist legal

activism have predominantly centred on the discussion of a positive right to abortion, arguing the
government has failed to ensure access to the service.263 Human rights are often divided into two
groupings, negative and positive rights. Negative rights are also referred to as “first generation
rights” and positive rights as, “second generation rights.”264 Ran Hirschl describes the difference
between the two, saying negative rights are often understood to guarantee freedom from state
interference,265 such as threat of punishment resulting from criminal prohibition. A negative rights
claim regarding abortion would thus focus on active state interference, such as the former criminal
prohibition on abortion struck down in Morgentaler. In its judgment, the Court did not guarantee
access to abortion, it merely sought to prevent additional barriers in access resulting from state
interference.
Linda White discusses this dichotomy, asserting the judgment in effect removed legal
barriers to abortion. However, she notes, “the majority of justices on the Supreme Court did not
rule that women had a ‘‘right’’ to abortion; rather, the majority of justices ruled that Criminal Code
provisions restricting abortion were so onerous as to constitute a violation of section 7 of the
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Charter.”266 White’s commentary touches on a clear misunderstanding in feminist activism of the
implications of the 1988 Morgentaler judgment with the dichotomy of positive and negative rights
at its core. As Joanna Erdman describes, feminist activism following Morgentaler “argued that
abortion rights carried with them an implied right of funding, that any legal right was inseparable
from the means necessary to exercise it.”267 However, White correctly identifies the implications
of the Morgentaler judgment. The judgment does not guarantee a positive right to abortion but
merely freedom from state interference with security of the person by threat of criminal sanction
under a scheme which provided a defence that was “illusory or so difficult to attain as to be
practically illusory.”268 The abortion rights which emerged post-Morgentaler did not ensure state
guaranteed or funded access to the service, merely freedom from onerous state interference or as
Erdman thoughtfully put it earlier, freedom to access the service as a commodity in a private
market.
Positive rights, in contrast, Hirschl says “include freedom to act in a positive way—
entailing the provision by some individual or institution of a valued service.”269 Positive rights are
often argued as requiring an act on the part of the government in order to ensure access to a
fundamental right. Cara Wilkie and Meryl Zisman Gary describe a positive rights claim under
section 7 as made out where, “the evidence demonstrates that a lack of government action
substantially impedes individuals’ ability to exercise their right to life, liberty, and/or personal
security.”270 For example, a positive rights argument under section 7 of the Charter would assert
that the government has a responsibility to provide citizens with the necessary amounts of water
266
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or food required to survive, and the failure to do so would be in breach of the right to life and
security of the person.
In addition, positive rights are often thought to include social or economic rights. Hirschl
says they engage government services such as healthcare, education, social security, and
welfare.271 Access to abortion is thus argued from a positive rights perspective as necessary in
order to ensure the section 7 guarantees or alternatively, as Emmett Macfarlane describes the
feminist discourse on the topic under section 15, linked to “women's reproductive rights to a
substantive conception of equality.”272 Margot Young writes, “the text of the Charter provides no
explicit guarantees of social and economic rights.”273 Because of this, Young – in speaking to
sections 7 and 15 of the Charter – observes that, “legal activism has focused on one or the other
of these two sections as an expandable base for textual interpretation that would allow for some
specific social and economic protection.”274 While the distinction between positive and negative
rights is important to examine the various approaches to challenging abortion access, as this thesis
will touch on later in the chapter, some argue the distinction is superficial in certain situations and
that the distinction between the two effectively collapses under close examination.
From a section 7 perspective, a positive rights argument asserts that governments’ failure
to ensure an accessible scheme for abortion services within each province violates section 7. As
recognized in the 1988 Morgentaler judgment, barriers in access leading to delays in obtaining an
abortion can have significant effects on a woman’s mental and physical wellbeing, interfering with
her bodily integrity. Therefore, a positive rights approach would argue the numerous barriers
currently existing in accessing abortion in Canada result from government inaction to ensure the
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service. As the current access scheme results in delays in obtaining abortion for women in rural
and remote communities, as well as for those who cannot afford to pay for clinic fees out-ofpocket, the current access scheme infringes on women’s security of the person and government
inaction violates section 7 of the Charter.
In addition, Charter-based positive rights approaches to abortion assert that failing to
ensure equitable access to abortion or reproductive health services in general, violates the
substantive equality protections under section 15 of the Charter. The Supreme Court has on
numerous occasions stated that the protections under section 15 are not only formal, but
substantive in nature.275 In recognizing that the protections under section 15 also promote
substantive equality, the court has stated that this will at times require the government to act to
ameliorate disadvantage.276 Therefore, positive rights Charter arguments have also been grounded
in the substantive equality protections under section 15.277 A positive rights approach to a section
15 claim would then assess what reproductive health services are available to men and assert the
government has a responsibility to ensure equal access to the relevant applicable service based on
the identity of the group. For example, the CCLA advances a similar argument in their statement
of claim for the challenge to clinic funding in New Brunswick. The section 15 argument examines
access to “similar basic health services.”278 In their filed statement the CCLA claims that the
challenged regulation “treats abortion services in a manner that is different from the way the
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Province treats similar basic health services,”279 comparing the barriers that men in New
Brunswick face when accessing vasectomies. Therefore, the CCLA is essentially arguing that the
failure to ensure equitable access to abortion across the province constitutes inequitable access to
reproductive services, which violates section 15.
Rachel Johnstone advocates for governments taking additional responsibility to create and
ensure a positive right to abortion access.280 Johnstone says this is necessary if women are to be
recognized as equal citizens and further, “this means not only the provision of services, but also a
safe social climate in which women can exercise these choices openly.”281 Speaking to the existing
barriers and privatized framework, Johnstone and Macfarlane together argue, “the barriers women
still face in Canada absent such protections showcase the consequences of failing to acknowledge
positive rights to abortion care.”282 According to Johnstone and Macfarlane, limiting abortion to a
negative rights discussion is clearly flawed, “particularly in the context of a provincial universal
health care system in Canada where publicly funded medical services are expected (and are
generally delivered by way of a government monopoly).”283
As discussed earlier, Erdman is critical of the effect of the 1988 Morgentaler judgment.
She describes the effect of the negative rights centred claim in Morgentaler, claiming it further
exacerbated inequality. Erdman writes, “the liberal abortion right of Morgentaler 1988, carried
forward by a liberal feminist movement, legitimized the withdrawal of the state, the privatization
of abortion care, and all the social inequalities of access that followed.”284 Further, Erdman asserts
this is exemplified by provincial health insurance funding regulations. She writes, “by restricting
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public funding to therapeutic abortions performed in hospitals settings, for example, provincial
governments repurposed the criminal law to explicitly ration access on the basis of wealth.”285
Erdman says in response, feminist activism switched paths to focus on positive rights claims and
access. She notes, “within this new political context, feminist activists shifted discursive strategy
and sought to rework the abortion right to secure access and equality.”286

A. Criticism of the rights dichotomy
While scholarly discourse on abortion access in Canada has examined the issue from both
a positive and negative rights perspective, many scholars call for the recognition of abortion as a
positive right. However, the distinction between positive and negative rights is argued by many to
be superficial. Discussing the dichotomy between the two groupings of rights, Ran Hirschl writes,
“several scholars have argued that a theoretical distinction between negative rights and positive
rights is questionable, primarily because many rights that have been traditionally labeled as
“negative” actually require some sort of public funding or state intervention.287 Emmett
Macfarlane agrees and refers to the conceptual distinction of positive and negative rights as “far
from straightforward.”288 Macfarlane writes, “as advocates for positive rights point out, the
enforcement of negative rights frequently requires governments to take action or spend money.”289
Further, Macfarlane says in certain health care cases, including abortion challenges, the distinction
between positive rights and negative rights effectively collapses into itself.290
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Margot Young is also critical of the distinction, calling it ambiguous and incoherent.291 She
voices similar sentiments to Macfarlane asserting that it is “well recognized that most rights require
a mix of positive and negative obligation and that the state action/inaction opposition is itself
conceptually indeterminate.”292 While Young is critical of the dichotomy she recognizes Canadian
courts continue to rely on this distinction.293 Marie Eve Sylvestre agrees, claiming the distinction
has been widely condemned by the legal community and in academic literature but that “the
distinction is still deeply ingrained in legal consciousness and discourse.”294 Perhaps one of the
clearest examples supporting these arguments that this thesis will next discuss is the fact that these
rights claims can often be framed from both a positive and negative rights perspective. However,
the implications of the judgment and the likelihood of success of the claim varies dependent on
how it is framed.

B. Barriers to the positive rights claim
According to Johnstone, Canadian caselaw has not addressed the issue of abortion access
from a positive rights perspective. She writes, “as will become evident in the cases selected, these
decisions have generally protected existing levels of access or prevented extensive state
interference in access but have rarely gone further in suggesting that abortion rights ought to be
read as a positive right.”295 However, according to Johnstone this is not unique to the issue of
abortion. She writes, “courts have generally avoided interpreting Charter rights as positive
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rights.”296 Wilkie and Gary voice similar concerns, saying that Canadian courts have left open a
positive rights interpretation for section 7 but have, “been slow to recognize positive obligations
as inherent in the right to life, liberty and security of the person protected under section 7 of the
Charter.297 Further the two write, “[e]xisting jurisprudence under section 7 indicates that while
courts pay lip service to the theoretical possibility that section 7 could be used to impose positive
obligations on government, they are unwilling to turn that possibility into reality.”298 The two
advance the judgments in Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General)299[Gosselin] and Wynberg v
Ontario [Wynberg],300 to support this argument.
Although almost 20 years old, the judgment in Gosselin is cited by many as denoting the
Supreme Court’s stance on positive rights.301 The case involved a constitutional challenge to
Québec’s social assistance program. The program provided a lower base payable amount for
individuals under the age of 30, citing a motive to encourage young people to get job training and
enter the workforce.302 In order for an individual under 30 to receive the similar base amount as
those over, they had to complete a work training program.303 Ms. Gosselin challenged the scheme
on the basis that it violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. Ms. Gosselin’s section 15 challenge
was a negative rights claim, that the law itself created a distinction on the basis of age. Her section
7 and 15 claims were positive rights claims. Under section 7, she argued the inadequate provisions
of state welfare in Québec violated her Charter protections.304 The central issue for the positive
rights element of the claim was whether the government’s failure to provide adequate benefits
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constituted a deprivation by the state.305 In its judgment, the Court acknowledged that section 7
has historically been tied to negative rights claims and active state interference with an individual’s
life or liberty resulting from a criminal law, but that section 7 claims were not exclusive to this
domain.306
Writing for the majority, then Chief Justice McLachlin discussed the application of section
7 to economic or social rights, saying it had not been discussed prior. According to McLachlin
CJC, even if economic rights were recognized to engage section 7, the Charter guarantee protected
against deprivations specifically. McLachlin CJC wrote, “nothing in the jurisprudence thus far
suggests that s. 7 places a positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life,
liberty or security of the person.”307 While McLachlin CJC stated that one day section 7 may be
interpreted to include positive rights, a deprivation did not exist in the case at bar.308 As stated
earlier, the judgment in Gosselin is often characterized as representing the courts approach to
positive rights, with many acknowledging that there is limited commentary from Canadian courts
on the issue.309 However, interestingly, while the court acknowledges the issue of positive rights
it fails to meaningfully address the issue. While earlier in the analysis McLachlin CJC outlines one
of the issues for consideration as to whether inadequate assistance constitutes a deprivation, in the
end, she fails to even consider the issue. The judgment seemingly finds no deprivation of section
7, without actually examining what a deprivation is or what act on the part of the state would
constitute a deprivation. There is no discussion as to whether the deprivation must be an active
force or whether it can result from the effect of passive state action.
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The claimants in Wynberg were denied leave to appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada
after receiving an unfavourable decision at the Ontario Court of Appeal.310 The case involved a
Charter challenge to programming for autistic children in Ontario which was not offered to
children over the age of six.311 Along with a number of other issues, the claimants in the case
argued the failure to provide the autistic programming for school-aged children violated section 7
of the Charter. The claimants’ argument asserted that the challenged programming for schoolaged autistic children, “is the one program known to provide any hope to autistic children of
becoming fully realized individuals, access to such programming is fundamental to the personhood
and development of autistic children.”312 In this regard, the claimants asserted, “the liberty interest
protected by s. 7 is a broad concept intended to vindicate individual autonomy and personhood,
and includes the right to make certain essential life decisions about oneself.”313
Further, the claimants argued that section 7 was also engaged by placing the individuals at
risk of mental suffering as “the appellant is depriving autistic children of any reasonable
expectation of success in life and of any realistic possibility of meaningful participation in the
community.”314 In assessing the claim under section 7, the court acknowledged the judgment in
Gosselin and concluded that the possibility for finding positive obligations under section 7 had
been “left open.”315 However similar to the judgment in Gosselin, without discussing what
constitutes a deprivation, the court found no deprivation. The court wrote, “the appellant's actions
in failing to provide intensive behavioural intervention consistent with the IEIP Guidelines to
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school-age children do not amount to depriving the respondents of a constitutionally protected
right and therefore do not contravene s. 7 as it is now understood.”316

C. Success in negative rights claims
In contrast, Wilkie and Zisman maintain that Chaoulli c Québec (Procureur Général)
[Chaoulli] 317 and Victoria (City) v Adams [Adams]

318

demonstrate an ability to find a novel

breach of section 7 where the claim involves negative rights.319 Chaoulli involved a challenge to
the prohibition of private health insurance in Québec. The challenger in the case, Mr. Zeliotis,
argued that the ban on private insurance forced individuals to use the public system which meant
enduring long wait times for health care procedures, in violation of section 7 of the Canadian
Charter and the rights to life and to personal security, inviolability, and freedom protected by
section 1 of Québec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.320
One of the reasons the judgment in Chaoulli is a novel application, is that the findings of
the court and the implications of the judgment are complex. Only seven judges of the Supreme
Court heard the case at bar and the decision was split with a three-judge minority finding violations
of both the Québec and Canadian Charters, and three judges finding it did not violate the Canadian
Charter. A single judgment from Justice Deschamp found violations of the Québec Charter but
declined to answer the question of the Canadian Charter as the legislation was therefore
invalidated. In her judgment, Justices Deschamps sided with Mr. Zeliotis, finding that the
prohibition on medical insurance forced Québeckers to face delays in the public system which
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affected their personal security under the Québec Charter.321 Justices McLachlin, Major, and
Bastarache found the prohibition also in violation of the Canadian Charter, noting the deprivation
was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice,322 and could not be saved under
section 1 of the Charter, as the public benefit did not outweigh the deleterious effect of the
legislation.323
Chaoulli is therefore not determinative on the issue of the Canadian Charter but a
persuasive and meaningful precedent for the application of section 7 regarding claims to healthcare
and outside of the procedural requirements of criminal law. The claim in Chaoulli was rooted in a
negative rights approach, as Mr. Zeilotis was not calling for funding for a healthcare service, but
instead wanted the freedom from state interference to pursue private insurance, allowing him to
skip the public line and access services privately. The minority judgment of Justices McLachlin,
Major, and Bastarache found a section 7 Canadian Charter violation due to long delays infringing
security of person caused by the government monopoly on Medicare.324 Grounding a substantial
portion of their analysis in the reasoning advanced by the 1988 Morgentaler judgment, the
minority judgment wrote, “the jurisprudence of this Court holds that delays in obtaining medical
treatment which affect patients physically and psychologically trigger the protection
of the Charter.”325
Further, speaking specifically to the application of section 7 outside of the criminal law
context, the justices found while the sanctions in Morgentaler were criminal and the penalties here
administrative, the consequences for both situations were serious.326 Specifically the justices

321

Ibid at 111.
Ibid at 153.
323
Ibid at 157.
324
Ibid at 106.
325
Ibid at 118.
326
Ibid at 121.
322

67

noted, “it was this constraint on security, taken from the perspective of the woman facing the health
care system, and not the criminal sanction, that drove the majority analysis in Morgentaler.”327
The minority justices opinion in Chaoulli is an example of willingness on the part of the Supreme
Court to engage section 7, not only outside of the criminal law context, but through a lens which
examines the concept of state interference through a wider lens. In addition, although the challenge
in Chaoulli is a negative rights claim, it turns on the failure of a government service, or a positive
right. In Chaoulli – and similarly to Adams as this thesis will next discuss – although the rights
violation is found in interfering legislation (a negative right), infringement would not have
occurred if the government offered a more effectual service (a positive right.)
Adams, a case from the BC court of appeal, involved a challenge to a municipal law in
Victoria banning “taking up a temporary abode overnight” in public parks.328 In Canadian
jurisprudence, the challenge in Adams perhaps most aptly addresses the blurring of the dichotomy
of positive and negative rights. The challengers in Adams asserted that the ban jeopardized the
health and safety of homeless individuals who had no other options but to stay in the parks
overnight. Their argument was based on the fact that the shelter system in Victoria was insufficient
to accommodate all of the city’s homeless individuals. Specifically, one of the intervenors, the
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association asserted, “regulation of public spaces is not
reasonable where it prevents the homeless, who have no access to private spaces, from engaging
in necessary life sustaining activities.”329
The BC appeal court sided with the challengers, finding the city’s prohibition violated the
applicants’ section 7 Charter rights. The Court agreed with the trial judge’s findings that “the
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majority of homeless people in Victoria have no choice but to sleep on public property… There is
no other place for them to go.”330 Further, the trial judge noted, “creating shelter to protect oneself
from the elements is a matter critical to an individual's dignity and independence.”331 Lastly, the
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s decision that “the state’s intrusion in this process
interferes with the individuals’ choice to protect themselves and is a deprivation of liberty within
the scope of s. 7.”332 In its judgment, the Court assessed whether state action was the cause of the
deprivation, considering the city’s argument that state action must be the main cause of the
deprivation and is not engaged where, “as a result of the state action, the claimants merely remain
in a state of insecurity.”333 The Court disagreed with this argument stating an “in and of itself”
causation requirement was inconsistent with previous Supreme Court judgments,334 and observing
that in Morgentaler, as well as Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), “the impugned
state action was not the sole cause of the deprivations at issue, yet the Court [in both cases] held
that the causation requirement was met.”335
The City asserted the decision of the trial judge was “founded on the failure of the
government to provide sufficient shelter beds,” and therefore, “the order effectively grants a right
to adequate alternatives to sleeping in public spaces.”336 Addressing whether or not the claim in
Adams was one for positive or negative rights, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge’s decision
did not require action on the part of the City to ensure shelter, rather it only required, “the City to
refrain from legislating in a manner that interferes with the s.7 rights of the homeless.”337
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However, the Court also noted that negative rights claims, from a practical point of view, can
create obligations on the City to take action in response.338 The Court stated this kind of responsive
action could be an element consistent with all Charter challenges. Depending on the claim, the
Court stated that positive action could be required, whether it be legislative or expending public
funds to ensure compliance.339 In the case at bar the Court wrote, “that will likely take the form
(as we were advised it already has) of some regulation of the overnight use of public parks, and
perhaps the creation of additional shelters or alternative housing, which is consistent with the City's
evidence about the initiatives it has undertaken to deal with the homeless.”340 However, according
to the Court, this did not mean the claim was a positive rights claim. The Court wrote, “that kind
of responsive action to a finding that a law violates s. 7 does not involve the court in adjudicating
positive rights.”341
Examining Adams one can see that the challenge in this case could have been framed from
a positive rights perspective, asserting a positive right on the part of the government to provide
shelter for homeless persons. However, as Margot Young asserts, the implications of a positive
rights judgment would be vastly different, and in her opinion more meaningful in addressing the
issue. For Young, “narrowing the claim to a mere negative right means that the solution or remedy
to the infringement is simply government forbearance – elimination of the prohibitive bylaws.”342
However, as Young asserts, “as any advocate for the homeless will attest, resolution of
homelessness requires significant government action – resources and proactive policy and
planning.”343 The challengers, however, advanced a negative rights claim arguing the city’s
338
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prohibition contained in the bylaws interfered with homeless individuals right to life, liberty, and
security of person and did so in a manner contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.344 While
Young is critical of the limited remedies available through a negative rights claim, she admits one
cannot fault the claimants for approaching the claim from the angle most likely to win.
Young is also critical of the judgment in Adams. Quoting Martha Jackman, Young asserts
that the court failed to “debunk the notion of a constitutionally meaningful distinction between
negative and positive rights,” and further that the, “reasoning reinforces the claimed contrast.”345
As Young writes, “[e]ven traditional “negative” rights must be supervised and supported by the
state using public resources.”346 The criminal law provides a clear example of this argument, in
which a vast amount of government resources are allocated just to implement and ensure negative
rights. As the Adams decision demonstrates, it is clear that a hardline dichotomy does not exist
between the two groupings of rights. The judgment clearly blurs the line between where negative
rights end and positive rights begin.
However, even Young’s own criticism demonstrates there are dramatically different
outcomes depending on which argument is advanced. While Macfarlane claims in certain cases
the two groupings effectively collapse into themselves, perhaps his most appropriate commentary
describes the dichotomy as instead, two ends of a spectrum.347 The amount of government
resources which need to be expended in order to ensure the right at issue varies depending on the
circumstances. With arguably, one end of the spectrum covering claims which involve minimal
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state interference and enforcement, and the other end of the spectrum involving claims to
government funded services, or access to basic goods, required to ensure socio-economic rights.
In addition, it is clearly established that Canadian courts still lean more favourably towards
challenges which fall on the less interventionist or negative rights side of the spectrum. Examining
the four cases above, it is apparent that challengers have historically been more successful in
advancing negative rights Charter claims, over positive rights claims. Young herself asserts the
section 7 claim in Adams was successful because it did not engage positive obligations.348 Wilkie
and Gary attribute Canadian courts reluctance to find positive rights violations for section 7 to a
deference “toward executive and legislative decisions on the allocation of scarce resource and the
prioritization of competing policy concerns.”349
Wilkie and Gary find this helps to explain the differential approach on the part of the courts
to negative and positive rights claims. They write, “the courts may be willing to recognize negative
rights claims, because they do not affect government allocation of resources but are wary of
recognizing positive rights claims, because doing so would not only question but directly affect
government distribution of resources.”350 However, as this thesis has discussed, negative rights
still require the expenditure of public resources to enforce, but perhaps not to the same extent as
positive rights. Further, the negative rights violations found in both Adams and Chaoulli are deeply
influenced by a positive right or government expenditure. Emmet Macfarlane also attributes the
varying approaches to negative and positive claims to Canadian courts deference to the legislature.
According to Macfarlane, “positive rights by definition are often going to mandate specific
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remedies,” and “this produces a more fundamental intrusion on the legislative decision-making
process than normally arises in the negative rights context.”351
Canadian courts reluctance to fully recognize positive rights claims may also be tied to
their transformative political implications and their potential to disrupt the status quo of Canadian
society. Colleen Shephard finds similar inherent issues with the recognition of substantive
equality. Although the substantive equality protections are under section 15 of the Charter, they
clearly imply positive rights obligations. Shephard says recognizing substantive equality, is “out
of sync with traditional legal doctrines, steeped as they are in the assumptions of classical liberal
thought.”352 Shephard writes, “[t]o carry substantive equality to its logical redistributive
conclusion would be to challenge some of the fundamental economic and political pillars of
modern society, something judges are unlikely to do.”353 The negative rights approach, as
demonstrated in Adams, did not require the city to provide housing for the homeless, but merely
to allow them to erect temporary shelters in the park. A positive rights claim would have required
the government to provide effective shelter for homeless populations, the means of which could
be a variety of different solutions including increasing shelter space, housing development, or even
ensuring a guaranteed basic income. Arguably the implications of the two approaches speak to
another concern guiding Canadian courts reluctance to find positive rights infringements: the fear
of opening up funding floodgates.
While recognizing a positive right to abortion would be the most comprehensive approach
to ensuring unbarred access to abortion, the success of such a claim would be unlikely.
Recognizing a fully positive right to abortion – one which would fall at the more interventionist
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end of the rights’ spectrum – would mean not only covering the cost of the service. A positive
right to abortion could require potentially ensuring extensive funding to develop rural and remote
access points, funding for travel expenses for remote populations or for those in later gestational
terms, and all other associated healthcare costs, including potentially birth control. The
implications would be wide-reaching, impacting the provision of a number of health services
across the country. While ideal, precedent from Canadian courts has not demonstrated a
willingness to engage on this level at this time.
Colleen Shephard takes this perspective in regard to a positive right under substantive
equality guarantees. She writes, “while the importance of ameliorative state action may be
recognized, there continues to be considerable judicial discomfort with the idea of acknowledging
positive economic and social rights.”354 This is even more relevant for claims under section 7 in
which recognizing a positive right could disrupt widespread government programming and policy.
The implications could potentially require restructuring of our entire social benefits system, a
guaranteed basic income, government subsidized housing, or comprehensive pharma care. While
many scholars have critiqued the negative rights approach to challenging abortion, it is clear that
while the negative/positive dichotomy is overdrawn, challenges which fall closure to the negative
rights end of the spectrum have had the greatest success historically. In addition, both Chaoulli
and Adams show a willingness on the part of the courts to engage section 7 when legislation
interferes with access to measures essential to security of the person and liberty, and the public
system is failing to provide comprehensive and adequate service. These claims also incentivize
provinces to either remove the barrier or ensure more comprehensive coverage in the public
system. While numerous barriers to abortion exist across the country, the unique provincial health
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insurance barriers in the Maritime provinces are arguably some of the most problematic and a
challenge to them has a promising chance of success based on Canadian precedent.
As interfering legislation or policy, the barriers can be challenged on the negative rights
end of the spectrum. By removing funding barriers this would not only prevent fee-for-service
charges at clinics, but it would incentivize additional clinics to open. Historically clinics which
have closed have cited the reason as funding barriers. Further, as discussed earlier, enabling access
to clinic abortions helps to address many of the other barriers, such as gestational limits, wait times,
and lack of service providers. As discussed at the beginning of Chapter Two, provinces with larger
access frameworks that allow for clinic funding perform more abortions per capita. Lastly, from a
health law perspective, this would also help to ensure greater adherence to the guiding principles
of the CHA.

D. A claim under section 15
Claims for access to abortion can also be advanced under section 15 of the Charter.
Abortion is a gendered issue and while men do not access the service, disproportionate access to
reproductive health care in the Maritime provinces could give rise to a section 15 violation. Like
section 7, the equality rights protection has its own inherent strengths and weakness. This section
will touch very briefly on the arguments involved in section 15 and the obstacles inherent in the
approach.
Of both sections 7 and 15 of the Charter, jurisprudence concerning section 15 lends itself
more readily to a positive rights claim. Over the last 30 years the Supreme Court has been more
willing to find in favour of claimants bringing positive rights claims under the section’s obligations
for substantive equality. The court has repeatedly recognized that the protections in section 15 are
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substantive in nature, and that at times ensuring equality will require differential treatment.355 As
discussed earlier, a section 15 claim could be advanced in the Maritime provinces, similar to the
CCLA’s argument in their statement of claim, comparing the access that both men and women
have to reproductive health services.
However, similar to section 7, the equality protections have their own inherent obstacles.
In regard to claims for a government service, discriminatory challenges can always be addressed
by levelling down or removing the increased benefit. While more open to the recognition of
positive rights under section 15 than under section 7, nonetheless the jurisprudence of section 15
demonstrates a reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to ensure positive rights. Even with
recognizing substantive equality, the court repeatedly confines the scope of the Charter protection
restricting the implications of the outcome. Statements from Justice La Forest in Eldridge
exemplify this tempering of implications. La Forest J asserts the government has no obligation to
ameliorate all disadvantage but that, “this Court has repeatedly held that once the state does provide
a benefit, it is obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory manner.”356 This concept is repeated
throughout section 15 jurisprudence.357 It exemplifies the courts hesitancy to find positive
obligations on the part of the government in not only section 7 claims, but section 15 as well.
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CHAPTER 4 - NEGATIVE RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE FROM
MORGENTALER (1988) TO JANE DOE
While previous activism and legal challenges have made progress in access to abortion in
the Maritime provinces,358 as discussed there still remain numerous barriers to accessing abortion
with prohibitions on private clinic funding aggravating the problematic access framework. As
noted, healthcare remedies, when used, appear to be almost completely ineffectual in creating
changes in access. Johnstone acknowledges the problematic approach of viewing abortion as a
health care issue. She writes, “understanding the limitations of the current treatment of abortion as
a healthcare issue is necessary to create positive change.”359 For example, Johnstone writes,
“extensive bureaucratic restrictions preventing women from accessing abortion care covered under
provincial health insurance is a case in point.”360 From a positive rights perspective, it is clear the
scholarship also appears to agree, while ideally there should be a positive obligation on the part of
the government to ensure access, the jurisprudence on positive rights does not strongly support
that claim.
Arguably, focussing the arguments on negative rights has greater potential for success
based on the courts’ approach to positive and negative rights claims, as well as the historical
jurisprudence. Emmett Macfarlane speaks to this approach regarding the 1988 Morgentaler
judgment. Macfarlane says the decision in Morgentaler, “refrained from even determining whether
there was a right to abortion grounded in privacy, personal autonomy or “interests unrelated to
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criminal justice.”361 Instead, Macfarlane writes, Dickson CJC’s decision is rooted in “state
interference with bodily integrity’ and state-imposed harms, particularly psychological stress
resulting from delays and unequal levels of access attributable to the Criminal Code provisions
that constituted an infringement of security of the person.”362 Dickson CJC’s decision is also rooted
in the unequal access to the criminal defence available under the previous Code framework. In
fact, Macfarlane quotes Justice Beetz’s concurring decision, writing he explicitly states, there
“must be state intervention for ‘security of the person’ in s. 7 to be violated.”363
As discussed, the negative rights approach has garnered criticism resulting from both the
access framework that emerged following the 1988 Morgentaler judgment and further, out of
concerns for the limited potential that it carries to bring about meaningful change. However, as
discussed, the negative rights claim is likely to be considered more favourably by Canadian courts.
In addition, the dichotomy between the two types of rights is at times illusory. Advancing a
negative rights claim to insurance barriers is a clear example of where the two categorizations of
rights effectively collapse into themselves. This is especially relevant where there is clear
legislative interference, like in New Brunswick and PEI. Challenging the insurance prohibition
would require the state to refrain from interfering with insurance coverage of clinic abortions, but
also allows for clinic billing to the provincial plan, effectively requiring the state to pay for clinic
abortions.
There are numerous limitations to the negative rights approach, including the challenge
becomes more difficult to advance when the legislative authority for the apparent denial of funding
is unknown, such as is the case in Nova Scotia. This is because it becomes less clear as to whether
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or not there is state interference when legislation is silent, and the funding denial is commissioned
through unwritten policy. A negative rights challenge will also not ensure widespread and
comprehensive access to abortion, but it will improve the existing access framework allowing for
more meaningful and comprehensive service. Further, even with prohibitions on clinic funding
struck down, access is still dependent on the initiative of health care providers to implement and
run clinics in the Maritime provinces. However, as is evident from other provinces, where the
provincial plan insures clinic abortions, clinics do operate and access is increased. In addition, as
discussed, barriers to clinic abortions exacerbate all other barriers, meaning that when there are
more clinics that are in operation, other barriers to access decrease in severity of impact.
Jurisprudence on abortion access, including the two Supreme Court Morgentaler
judgments, lend themselves favourably to a negative rights approach. The same can be said for a
judgment from Manitoba’s provincial court in the early 2000s. In 2004 a lower Manitoba court
assessed a negative rights claim to insurance prohibitions on abortion in a promising judgment in
Jane Doe v Manitoba.364 The case was initiated by two unnamed women who had both paid for
private clinic abortions in Manitoba to avoid long wait times in the hospital system.365 The two
challenged a section of the Excluded Service Regulation, made under the province’s Health
Services Insurance Act.366 Former regulation 46/93 listed the following as uninsured services:
“Therapeutic abortion, unless performed by a medical practitioner (a) in a hospital in Manitoba
other than a private hospital licenced under The Private Hospitals Act.”367 The two applicants
asserted the law was unconstitutional in that it violated the section 2(a) guarantee for freedom of

364

Jane Doe v Manitoba, supra note 205.
Ibid.
366
Excluded Services Regulation, Man Reg 46/93.
367
Ibid at s 28.
365

79

conscience, the section 15 equality rights protection, and the section 7 right to life, liberty, and
security of the person.368
On summary judgment the justice at the provincial court agreed with the applicants, citing
the 1988 Morgentaler judgment in the reasons. Finding the impugned legislation interfered with
the women’s section 7 rights, the decision drew comparisons to the situation in Morgentaler. The
Court wrote, “the harm caused by a delay in obtaining an abortion as alluded to by Dickson CJC
in Morgentaler, supra, is exactly the same type of harm Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 say is created
by the delays and waiting periods faced by women wanting a therapeutic abortion paid for by the
Plan which delays and waiting periods are, in turn, occasioned by the impugned legislation.”369
Continuing on with the findings the Court, similarly to Adams, grounded the rights infringement
in the failings of the current government system. The Court stated, “[i]n my view, the effect of the
impugned legislation, including the Regulation, is to tell every pregnant woman that she cannot
submit to a safe medical procedure that might be clearly beneficial to her unless she does so at a
time and place dictated by a backlogged, publicly-funded health care system.”370
The Court commented that depriving a woman of her right to decide where and when she
will undergo the procedure due to a backlogged and publicly funded system not only threatened
her in a physical sense but also “the agony caused by not knowing whether an abortion will be
performed in time is bound to inflict emotional distress and serious psychological harm upon
her.”371 Finding the regulation was in violation of all three Charter sections, the Court noted,
“legislation that forces women to have to stand in line in an overburdened, publicly-funded health
care system and to have to wait for a therapeutic abortion, a procedure that provably must be
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performed in a timely manner, is a gross violation of the right of women to both liberty and security
of the person as guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.”372 The court also found the legislation to be in
violations of sections 2(a) and 15 of the Charter. Further, agreeing with Justice Wilson’s opinion
in Morgentaler, the Court wrote, “a deprivation of a s. 7 right which has an adverse effect on a
right guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter cannot be said to be in accordance with the fundamental
principles of justice.”373 Lastly, the Court agreed with the two women, finding the regulation could
not be saved under section 1 as it failed to pass any of the three parts of the Oakes Test.374 The
Court found the “real objective” of the impugned legislation was to prevent Dr. Morgentaler or
any other such person from operating a free-standing abortion clinic in Manitoba.375 Concluding
the judgment, the Court found the legislation was not minimally impairing, rational, or fair, and
lastly, that it was arbitrary in nature.376
The decision of the lower court was appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal which found
that the issues engaged were too complex to be decided as a matter of summary judgment.377
Setting aside the lower court’s judgment and sending the issue back for trial the Court of Appeal
wrote, “these important Charter issues involve complex and developing areas of the law which
require a full factual underpinning based on a trial record.”378 Following the decision from the
Court of Appeal, the Manitoba provincial government amended the regulations to remove the
challenged section, effectively rendering moot any further challenges on this issue. It should be
noted that the Court of Appeal did not agree nor disagree with the trial judge, it declined to engage
on the substantive Charter issues. The Court of Appeal only disagreed as to whether the issue
372
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could be determined on summary judgment, leaving the Charter analysis open for further
interpretation. The judgment of the provincial court, therefore, still remains a promising precedent
for a negative rights challenge to insurance prohibitions for abortion funding.

I.

A Positive or a Negative Claim?
Rachel Johnstone speaks to the importance of the precedent set by Jane Doe. However,

Johnstone refers to the judgment as a “notable precedent in the recognition of positive rights to
abortion access.”379 This is because Johnstone characterizes the impugned law to be “positive in
character.”380 This, according to Johnstone, is because “the law was intended to grant some
coverage, but it fell short of setting out to create universal coverage.”381 Johnstone’s assertion
demonstrates the overlap between positive and negative rights addressed in Adams. However,
although outcomes can have positive implications, it doesn’t necessarily make the challenge a
positive rights’ claim. While the claim is to economic coverage for a government benefit, the lower
Court’s judgment is specifically focused on the active state interference of a right caused by the
impugned legislation. Further, while a challenge could be framed as an issue of positive rights –
as the government’s failure to ensure funding to private clinics – the actual challenge was centred
on the infringing legislation.
The judgment of the Court spoke specifically to state interference: it falls at the negative
end of the rights spectrum. The Court wrote, “I am convinced that psychological stress is the almost
inevitable result when the impugned legislation forces women to wait for an abortion funded by
the Government at a hospital.”382 Further, the Court noted, “[t]his state-imposed stress suffered by
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women who must wait for an abortion is, in my opinion, serious in nature.”383 Focusing the
decision specifically on the interfering legislation the Court wrote, “[i]n my view, there is no
reason or logic behind the impugned legislation which prevents women from having access to
therapeutic abortions in a timely way.”384 Finding causation of the violation specifically resulting
from the state action, the Court found, “[i]n simple terms, delayed access for a woman wishing to
have a safe, state-funded therapeutic abortion is the result of the impugned legislation.”385
The judgment in Jane Doe v Manitoba is illustrative of the positive rights implications
resulting from a negative rights claim as discussed in Adams. It too demonstrates the blurring of
the dichotomy and how the implications of a negative rights judgment can slide further down the
spectrum towards that of a claim on the positive end. Similar to Adams and Chaoulli the negative
rights infringement is in part determined by the failures of the positive right; the public system or
government service. The challenge, while framed as a negative rights claim and centred on state
interference, is simultaneously rooted in the prohibition of funding the service, directly engaging
socio-economic interests. The outcome of which, removing the funding barrier, requires the state
to fund additional services. The judgment also arguably exemplifies how while there is overlap of
the rights, there still remains a distinction. As noted, the judgment is steadfast in its focus on the
legislative barrier interfering with ability to access an abortion without delay.

II.

An Arbitrary Law in Violation of Security of the Person
While there are numerous barriers to abortion in the Maritime provinces, resulting in an

extremely problematic access scheme, the regulations prohibiting provincial health insurance are
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arguably the most likely to be successfully challenged. This is because of Canadian courts historic
approach to positive and negative rights claims, as discussed above. Insurance regulations can be
framed as a negative rights infringement because the government regulation is interfering with
access, as was the case in Jane Doe v Manitoba. In addition, as discussed above, prohibitions on
insurance funding for clinic abortions exacerbate the other barriers of wait times, gestational limits,
and physical access. This is because clinics provide more access points and more comprehensive
service. They prevent bottle necking in the hospital system, simultaneously allowing wait times to
drop. In addition, clinics themselves often have shorter wait times as they often only perform the
specialized procedure, as opposed to hospitals which address numerous other health concerns.
Further, clinics often offer a more supportive environment with more flexible gestational limits.
Allowing funded access to abortion clinics not only helps to address a number of the
existing barriers in the Maritime provinces, it promotes equality in access. From a section 7
perspective, legislation which limits access to clinics contributes to additional travel, longer wait
times, and lack of service providers, thus creating a framework which infringes on women’s rights
to life, liberty, and security of person. Without clinic access points, the public system is failing to
offer comprehensive and accessible service, especially after the first trimester. Because of this,
insurance barriers in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and PEI are quite clearly in violation of section
7 of Charter. This is not only supported by the lower court precedent in Jane Doe v Manitoba, but
in the historical jurisprudence surrounding abortion in Canada, including the two Supreme Court
Morgentaler judgments.
As discussed, section 7 of Charter guarantees the right to life, liberty, and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of

84

fundamental justice.386 Any deprivation of the right must be in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice, as Dickson CJC describes it in Morgentaler, “the section states clearly that
those interests may be impaired only if the principles of fundamental justice are respected.”387
Therefore an initial finding of a violation of one of the section 7 guarantees does not end the inquiry
but triggers an examination of whether the deprivation has occurred in accordance with the
principles. In Morgentaler, Dickson CJC noted that the unequal operation of the abortion law itself
would not necessarily violate the principles of fundamental justice, but that the most serious
problems with the functioning of the former Code scheme were created by the law itself.388
Dickson CJC asserted, “one of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that, when
Parliament creates a defence to a criminal charge, the defence should not be illusory or so difficult
to attain as to be practically illusory.”389 Further, Dickson CJC wrote, “Parliament must be given
room to design an appropriate administrative and procedural structure for bringing into operation
a particular defence to criminal liability.”390 But if that structure is "so manifestly unfair, having
regard to the decisions it is called upon to make, as to violate the principles
of fundamental justice,” Dickson CJC continued, “that structure must be struck down.”391 In the
present case, Dickson CJC wrote, “the structure – the system regulating access to therapeutic
abortions – is manifestly unfair.”392
The principles of fundamental justice include, among other protections, protections against
arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality.393 A deprivation of right will be
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considered to be arbitrary where it bears no connection to the law’s purpose or objective.394 A law
is overbroad if it overreaches and captures conduct not intended to be included in the legislation.395
Laws are grossly disproportionate when the effect of the legislation on the protected rights is so
grossly disproportionate to its purposes it cannot be rationally supported.396
A section 7 analysis as outlined by the Supreme Court in R v Malmo-Levine,397 looks first
to whether there has been a deprivation of one of the three guarantees, and then second to whether
the deprivation has occurred in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.398 The
second stage of the analysis can occur in two parts. First, the court will identify the relevant
principle of fundamental justice and then second, the court will determine whether the violation of
the three guarantees occurred in accordance with the identified principle.399

III.

Analysis: Is There a Breach of One of the Three Guarantees?
As discussed, Canadian jurisprudence on abortion shows a clear willingness on the part of

the courts to engage section 7 protections of security of the person, regarding limitations and
restrictions on accessing abortion.400 Where funding of clinics is prohibited, women who cannot
afford to pay for an abortion out-of-pocket are forced to access hospitals for service. The current
public system in the Maritime provinces is failing. With limited hospitals performing the service
this results in mandatory travel – at times interprovincially – delays in accessing service, as well
as undergoing a more invasive procedure. Many of the barriers to accessing abortion existing
today, which are exacerbated by or result from the prohibition on clinic funding in the Maritime
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provinces, are the same or identical to those which were documented in the Badgley report in the
1970s,401 barriers the Supreme Court in Morgentaler found to be in violation of section 7.
The engagement of section 7 in Morgentaler resulted not from the direct prohibition of
abortion, but from the effects of the administrative barriers resulting in a problematic access
scheme under the designated framework. In Morgentaler, Dickson CJC disagreed with the
Crown’s assertion that the barriers existing under the current scheme were the result of
administrative issues, and therefore not a result of state interference. He wrote, “it is not possible
to say that delay results only from administrative constraints, such as limited budgets or a lack of
qualified persons to sit on therapeutic abortion committees.”402 Dickson CJC attributed the delays
directly to the impugned legislation. He wrote, “[a]lthough the mandate given to the courts under
the Charter does not, generally speaking, enable the judiciary to provide remedies for
administrative inefficiencies, when denial of a right as basic as security of the person is infringed
by the procedure and administrative structures created by the law itself, the courts are empowered
to act.”403 Lastly, Dickson CJC wrote, “even if the purpose of legislation is unobjectionable, the
administrative procedures created by law to bring that purpose into operation may produce
unconstitutional effects, and the legislation should then be struck down.”404
As asserted in the CCLA’s statement of claim, the effect of the ban on clinic funding in
New Brunswick forces numerous women to travel to access service. This means additional
financial resources, days off work, and further hoops to jump through, also resulting in delays
obtaining an abortion. Dickson CJC specifically discussed the effect of requiring women to travel
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to access service. He wrote, “[i]f women were seeking anonymity outside their home town or were
simply confronting the reality that it is often difficult to obtain medical services in rural areas, it
might be appropriate to say “let them travel”.”405 However, Dickson CJC said in the situation at
bar it was the law itself that forced women to travel and created additional burdens for women. He
wrote, “the enormous emotional and financial burden placed upon women who must travel long
distances from home to obtain an abortion is a burden created in many instances by Parliament.”406
Delays in obtaining therapeutic abortions subjected women to both psychological and
physical harm or risk of harm infringing a woman’s right to security of the person a clear violation
of section 7’s protection of security of the person in Morgentaler. In addressing the delays caused
by the previous framework discussed in Morgentaler Dickson CJC wrote, “the above physical
interference caused by the delays created by s. 251, involving a clear risk of damage to the physical
well-being of a woman, is sufficient, in my view, to warrant inquiring whether s. 251 comports
with the principles of fundamental justice.”407 However, as discussed, Dickson CJC also found the
delays caused harm to women’s psychological integrity. He noted, delay in accessing abortion
“greatly increases the stress levels of patients, and that this can lead to more physical complications
associated with abortion.”408 For Dickson CJC, this was a further violation of section 7 resulting
from the scheme. It would be unreasonable to argue that requiring women to travel long distances
to a limited number of services providers would not incur a delay. The very obstacle of requiring
women to complete an eight-hour round trip drive, in order to access service, with a support
individual, would involve coordinating two persons with time off work, booking travel,
accommodation etc. It is no insignificant barrier.
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Not only do insurance barriers result in travelling long distances and additional delays, they
also limit access to the procedure in general. This is in part because as discussed earlier, private
clinics cannot exist within the two-tiered system. In addition, as clinics perform abortions later in
pregnancy, the ban on clinic funding essentially limits abortions to the first trimester.409 This in
effect forces some women to carry a foetus to term. Restricting access to clinic abortions means
also fewer service providers, in effect limiting access to abortions. Simply put, with fewer service
providers there are fewer procedures. As noted earlier, this is supported by what limited statistical
information there is on the number of abortions performed in Canada. Provinces with fewest access
points perform the lowest number of abortions on a per capita basis.410 Further, as discussed,
previous clinics in the Maritime provinces cited lack of provincial funding as the reason for their
closures. All of these various restrictions in access have dramatic impacts on a woman’s mental
and physical wellbeing. Being forced to carry a foetus not only has immense physical and
psychological implications on a woman, it has a large financial burden, pushing women who
cannot afford the procedure further into poverty.

IV.

Principles of Fundamental Justice
Arguably the most relevant principle for this argument is the principle of arbitrariness. The

Supreme Court summarized the principle in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General). 411
Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, stated, “where the deprivation of the right in question
does little or nothing to enhance the state's interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that a
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breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individual's rights will have been deprived
for no valid purpose.”412 Continuing on with the discussion Sopinka J noted, “it follows that before
one can determine that a statutory provision is contrary to fundamental justice, the relationship
between the provision and the state interest must be considered.”413 Neither New Brunswick’s
Medical Services Payment Act, nor PEI’s Health Services Payment Act, contain objective or
purpose sections outlining the intent of the legislation. In addition, since minimal information is
published on abortion online from Maritime government resources it makes it difficult to ascertain
why the government has chosen to ban clinic funding and what purpose it serves.
Governments have historically claimed three governmental objectives in restricting access
to clinic abortions. The first is restricting abortions for health and safety purposes. The second is
regulating the allocation of government resources for health funding. The third is the importance
of maintaining a public health care system and preventing the emergence of private clinics. Both
the second and the third objectives were read into PEI’s Health Services Payment Act in
Morgentaler v Prince Edward Island. The PEI Court of Appeal interpreted the purpose of the
Heath Service Payment Act to be, “to mandate the Agency to develop, operate, and administer a
publicly funded health care insurance scheme for residents of the Province.”414 Joanna Erdman
notes this has been the predominant response to cries for abortion funding. She writes, political
responses have been, “voiced in the sustainability of Medicare and the need to ration public health
care dollars.”415
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Returning to the first historical objective – that abortions should be restricted to hospitals
for health reasons416 – governments have argued that hospitals are better equipped to deal with
complications, and therefore more likely to protect the health and well-being of the mother.417
Sanda Rogers maintains that these objectives are not the honest motivation for abortion funding
restrictions. She writes, “while access to some health care is rationed for reasons of cost or
therapeutic appropriateness, abortion is denied for reasons of inappropriate political expediency or
provider morality.”418 Emmet Macfarlane also finds no valid reason for limiting abortions to a
hospital setting. He writes, there is “no medical evidence as to why cost, complexity of procedure,
or availability of expertise would justify limiting abortion services compared to similar
procedures.”419 In addition, arguably the ban on clinic funding in reality subjects women to
increased health risks. As discussed, forcing women to obtain abortions in hospital requires them
to experience increased wait times or travel for service. The health risks of forcing women to
experience delays in obtaining an abortion was well-documented in Morgentaler.
Regarding the second objective of allocating scarce health resources, Johnstone would
likely find the means to be futile. Johnstone says there does not appear to be a valid reason for
denying funding of abortion, viewing it as a fundamental health service. Johnstone writes,
“abortions are safe, inexpensive, and require minimal physician training. In this respect, the
suggestion that abortion should be treated as a core, medically necessary service is
uncontroversial.”420 In addition, withholding funds for the service subjects the provinces to the
mandatory deductions for extra-billing under the CHA. If the provinces refuse to fund clinics they
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can still be charged the dollar-for-dollar amount of the procedures making it an equal cost for their
health care resources.
Regarding the third objective of protecting the public system, the legislation likely hinders
that objective. Insurance barriers to private clinics force them to operate within a private market
on a fee-for-service bases. This in effect creates a two-tiered health care system effectively
splintering the public system and setting a harmful precedent. Further, this is not the first time a
government policy objective for legislating restrictions on abortion access was hindered by the
legislation itself. In his Oakes assessment in Morgentaler, Chief Justice Dickson noted the former
Code provisions were counterproductive to the objectives of the legislation. He wrote, “to the
extent that s. 251(4) is designed to protect the life and health of women, the procedures it
establishes may actually defeat that objective.”421
Erdman notes the concern of a possible conflict between a Charter-based argument
regarding access to abortion and promoting a public health care system. She writes, historically
“some feminist groups shared this concern, questioning whether Charter litigation on abortion
funding was a good idea, or whether it would lead to greater privatization in the system.”422 Karl
Guebert speaks to this challenge broadly. He writes, “perhaps the most significant threat to
Canada’s single-tier public healthcare system as it currently exists does not come from
conservative or libertarian politicians or governments; it comes from Canadians themselves. More
specifically, the threat derives from Canadians seeking a right to healthcare.’423 However,
prohibiting funding of free-standing abortion clinics forces them into the private market. It
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effectively creates a two-tiered health care system and private market for abortion. When the
private clinics are in operation, this means that women who can afford to pay for private clinics
can access abortion in a timely manner and at later stages of pregnancy. Those who cannot afford
to pay are forced to travel long distances, carrying the foetus for longer which endangers the
pregnant woman’s physical as well as mental health and wellbeing. However, past experience in
the Maritime provinces shows that the two-tiered system within the provinces is unsustainable.
Historically, private clinics have been unable to operate without public funding, effectively forcing
women to access abortions through the limited existing hospital service providers. If abortion
clinics were publicly funded it would prevent splintering of abortion healthcare or further
restricting Canada’s access framework. In addition, funding clinics also ensures compliance with
the principles of the CHA and promoting public health care.
In both Supreme Court Morgentaler decisions, the Court asserted that there is no valid
reason for abortions to be performed only in hospital. In his concurring decision in Morgentaler,
Justice Beetz found there was no medical justification for the in-hospital requirement of the former
Criminal Code sections. Noting the objective of the law was to protect the health of women and
prevent complications, Beetz J wrote, “the requirement that all therapeutic abortions be performed
in eligible hospitals is unnecessary to meet that objective in all cases.”424 Finding the requirement
served no real purpose, Beetz J asserted, “in this sense, the rule is manifestly unfair and offends
the principles of fundamental justice.”425 Justice Sopinka affirmed this, writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court in the 1993 R v Morgentaler. In the judgment, Sopinka J found the there was no
evidence on the record as to why abortions performed in clinics would pose a greater threat to
women’s health. He wrote, “women may not wish to have an abortion in a hospital for any number
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of legitimate reasons.”426 Sopinka J specifically attributed the in-hospital requirement to the
demise of the former sections of the Criminal Code. In addition, he wrote, “one of the effects of
the legislation is consolidation of abortions in the hands of the provincial government, largely in
one provincially-controlled institution. This renders free access to abortion vulnerable to
administrative erosion.”427
Macfarlane says examining the history of abortion regulation, the motives are often more
ingenuine and less likely to survive Charter scrutiny. Macfarlane writes, “the history of provincial
laws or regulations relating to abortion in the post-Morgentaler context strongly suggests little
more than moral-based considerations on the part of governments refusing to provide full
access.”428 Johnstone agrees and says the motivation appears to be more political. “It is evident
that these roadblocks are not motivated by a desire to create improved health care for women,” she
writes, “but to block access to what is portrayed as an immoral and undesirable procedure.”429
Information from the CCLA’s statement of claim supports this perspective. According to
the statement of claim, New Brunswick’s health insurance plan provides coverage for out-ofhospital reproductive services, including vasectomies.430 In addition, arguably the acts of the
various provincial governments in response to funding claw backs demonstrate a hidden intent. If
health care funding is the guiding concern for restricting abortion access to hospitals, then why are
provincial governments unmoved by funding claw backs? It would be naïve to consider funding
the dominant motive when provinces like Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have historically been
unconcerned by threats of dollar-for-dollar deductions under the CHA.
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Historically the courts have recognized that hidden objectives prohibiting abortion for
morality purposes are often at play behind restricting abortion access. In the 1993 Morgentaler
judgment Sopinka J noted, “the primary objective of the legislation was to prohibit abortions
outside hospitals as socially undesirable conduct, and any concern with the safety and security of
pregnant women or with health care policy, hospitals or the regulation of the medical profession
was merely ancillary.” Further, Sopinka J noted, “this legislation involves the regulation of the
place where an abortion may be obtained, not from the viewpoint of health care policy, but from
the viewpoint of public wrongs or crimes.”431 As discussed, the Manitoba provincial court in Jane
Doe found similar objectives in the case at bar. Finding the real objective was preventing Dr.
Morgentaler or any other person from operating a free-standing clinic in Manitoba. The court
wrote, “that objective can hardly be said to be of sufficient importance to override constitutionally
protected rights such as the right to freedom of conscience, the right to liberty and security of the
person or the right to equality.”432
The complete lack of transparency regarding abortion services and regulation throughout
the Maritime provinces but especially in Nova Scotia lends itself to this argument. Erdman speaks
on the issue, asserting it is inconsistent with the rule of law. She writes, “as a rule of law principle,
transparency speaks to the importance of law being known.”433 She continues, “where the basis
for government action, let alone the action itself, is unknown, people cannot know where they
stand in relation to the state and its exercise of power.”434 Further, Erdman continues, “one of the
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first requirements of the rule of law is thus an obligation on government to be explicit in its
exercises of public power.”435
The prohibition on clinic funding in the Maritime provinces forces women who cannot
afford to pay for the service out-of-pocket to experience delays in the public system. Canadian
jurisprudence in Chaoulli, Jane Doe, and Adams, supports the argument that where legislation
interferes with an individual’s ability to pursue an alternative course of action which would enable
their security of the person and there is no effective alternative in the public system, it constitutes
a violation of the Charter right. Prohibitions on clinic funding are arbitrary. It is clearly established
by the case law that there is no reason to limit abortions to the hospital setting. Further in that the
objective is the promotion of a public health care system, concerns for safety and health of the
woman, and the scarce allocation of government resources, the legislation actually hinders those
objectives. Abortion is restricted for political and moral reasons, bearing no rational connection to
the law’s objective or purpose. Because of this, the violation cannot be considered in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.

V.

Oakes Test
Charter violations, once found, can be saved under section 1, which guarantees the rights

of the Charter within a reasonable limit.436 In assessing if a violation can be saved under section
1, courts apply the framework outlined in R v Oakes,437 more commonly referred to as the Oakes
test. The Oakes test is a two-part analysis which at the first stage examines whether there is a
pressing and substantial government objective.438 At the second stage, the government must
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demonstrate, “the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified.”439 The second stage
of the analysis is a proportionality inquiry which considers three factors. The first consideration is
that the means must be rationally connected to the objective. They must not be, “arbitrary, unfair
or based on irrational considerations.”440 The second consideration is whether the infringement is
minimally impairing. Meaning that, even if the means are rationally connected, they must impede
on the right as little as possible.

441

The last consideration is a weighing of the above factors. In

order to pass the Oakes test, as stated in R v Oakes, there must be a proportionality between
the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom and the
objective which has been identified as of "sufficient importance.”442
Notably, former Chief Justice Lamer in his majority judgment in New Brunswick (Minister
of Health and Community Services) v G (J),443 asserted section 7 violations are not easily saved by
section 1. Quoting his own judgment in Re BC Motor Vehicles Act, Lamer CJC wrote, “Section 1
may, for reasons of administrative expediency, successfully come to the rescue of an otherwise
violation of s. 7, but only in cases arising out of exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters,
the outbreak of war, epidemics, and the like.”444 Lamer CJC explained this is for two reasons. First,
the rights protected under section 7 are, “very significant and cannot ordinarily be overridden by
competing social interests.”445 Second, “rarely will a violation of the principles of fundamental
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justice, specifically the right to a fair hearing, be upheld as a reasonable limit demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.”446
It is unlikely the current prohibitions on insurance funding would survive an Oakes test. At
the first stage, it is hard to discern whether there is a pressing and substantial government objective.
As discussed, there is little published and known about the government objectives and, many
question the integrity of reported objectives including rationing health care funding, preventing
privatization, and protecting women’s health. There is sustained criticism of provincial regulation
of abortion, attributing the motives for doing so to religious and moral purposes. If the objective
is unknown or falsely presented, then it cannot be considered to be a valid, pressing, and substantial
government objective. Further, even if the objectives are pressing and substantial, the regulations
would fail the second stage of the Oakes Test.
As discussed earlier in regard to the principles of fundamental justice, the legislation is
arbitrary and not rationally connected, in that it does not serve the assumed objective. To the extent
that the objective is to promote women’s health and wellbeing, promote a public health care
system, and/or ration health care spending, the effect of the clinic funding regulations is to impede
those objectives. In addition, clinic funding regulations are not minimally impairing. The
legislation, in effect, forces women to carry a foetus for longer by limiting access to abortion
services. The Supreme Court has stated that the mental and physical implications of this are
potentially devastating.447 The risks to women’s health far outweigh the objectives of the
legislation, especially in that the objectives are often ingenuine and not effectively served by the
legislation. The importance of maintaining access to abortion cannot be overlooked. It not only
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influences the physical and psychological health of Canadian women but touches on women’s role
within society as a whole. Erdman describes this succinctly: “Abortion rights mediate the
relationship between women and the state, and thereby shape the use of its power for women's
security, equality, and freedom in the public interest.”448

CONCLUSION
Although the 1988 Morgentaler judgment struck down the criminal prohibition it far from
ensured a right to, or comprehensive access to, abortion in Canada. The judgment led to a
jurisdictional movement of abortion, from the federal government’s authority over criminal law to
provincial jurisdiction over health care. The transition then brought new challenges for abortion
rights advocates. Following decriminalization, a strong anti-abortion public sentiment in the
Maritime provinces lead to provincial attempts to restrict access to service. The provinces sought
to achieve this goal by enacting provincial regulations prohibiting doctors from performing
abortions outside of hospitals and prohibiting insurance funding of abortions performed in clinics
or outside of a designated scheme. While clinic abortions are no longer prohibited under provincial
regulations, barriers to insurance funding of clinic abortions still remain in all three Maritime
provinces. Funding for clinic abortions is still prohibited under New Brunswick’s, Regulation 8420 and PEI’s regulations under the Health Services Payment Act. As previously discussed, the
funding arrangements for clinic abortions in Nova Scotia are unclear and there is currently no
abortion clinic in the province. However, it is likely that if a clinic were to open it would go either
fully or partially unfunded, similar to the previous Morgentaler clinic.
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Contemporary scholarship on the issue has predominantly focused on seeking to ensure
guaranteed access to abortion as a positive right or has examined the issue through the lens of
Canadian health law, arguing the failure to ensure comprehensive service is in violation of the
Canada Health Act. However as discussed, the remedies available under the CHA have proven
ineffectual and, in the past, have been seldom utilized. Human rights jurisprudence demonstrates
an unwillingness on the part of Canadian courts to find positive rights violations. This is in part
due to courts deference to the legislature on government programming or as some argue, out of
fear of the economic ramifications of such a judgment and the potential to disrupt the status quo.
While political and legal activism has increased access in the Maritime provinces, insurance
barriers to accessing abortion still remain. Both Supreme Court Morgentaler judgments and the
decision from the provincial court in Jane Doe are promising precedents for challenging insurance
barriers in the Maritime provinces through a negative rights legal challenge.
While the negative rights approach has been criticized, there are arguably inherent
strengths in continuing to challenge barriers to abortion access through negative rights, including
that there is greater likelihood of success. Historically, Canadian courts are more likely to engage
section 7 on socio-economic issues when framed as a negative rights claim. Further, although this
thesis advocates for specifically challenging health insurance regulations, prohibitions on clinic
funding exacerbate all of the other discussed barriers. Allowing for clinic funding would help to
ensure a more comprehensive, timely, and accessible framework for abortion access in the
Maritime provinces. In addition, the dichotomy between positive and negative rights is
questionable. While the challenge to insurance prohibitions can be framed from a negative
perspective, a favourable judgment has positive rights implications, specifically, provincial
funding for abortion services.
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Although the negative rights challenge can prevent insurance barriers to abortion, it is still
dependent on service providers opening clinics in the Maritime provinces. Insurance barriers are
also only one of numerous barriers to accessing abortion in the provinces. However, as discussed,
insurance barriers exacerbate all other barriers. Further, evidence from other provinces
demonstrates that provinces with more comprehensive health insurance funding, have larger and
more accessible access frameworks. Whereas in contrast, historically, clinics have been unable to
maintain service in provinces which deny insurance funding. This effectively forces women to
either access service through the hospital system or travel outside of their home province for
service.
Prohibitions on insurance funding can be challenged through a negative rights challenge
where there is legislative interference. This is because the legislation actively infringes on a
woman’s right to security of person. Restrictions on clinic funding disincentivizes the operation of
abortion clinics or effectively force existing clinics to close, restricting access to service providers.
In effect, this causes women to travel great distances and incur longer waits in accessing service.
Further, as clinics help to ensure comprehensive access to service after the first trimester,
limitations on clinic funding also restrict abortions to the first trimester. Barriers, almost identical
to the current impediments existing in the Maritime provinces, were considered by the court in
Morgentaler (1998), to infringe the Charter’s section 7 guarantee of security of the person.
Although abortion is no longer criminalized, as discussed, the insurance prohibitions have
a similar effect to the former criminal prohibitions in that they force women to incur longer waits
or travel to access service. Judgments such as Chaoulli demonstrate the Supreme Court is willing
to apply the protections of section 7 to state action that falls outside of the criminal law context,
but still interferes with life, liberty, or security of the person. Further, the lower Manitoba court in
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Jane Doe found the health insurance prohibitions which formerly existed in that province to be in
violation of section 7. In addition, these barriers cannot be considered to be in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice or to be saved under the Charter’s reasonable limit provision.
The barriers are arbitrary as they, not only do not support the purported government objectives,
they actively hinder progress towards those goals. Abortion clinic funding barriers not only
promote an unsustainable two-tiered or privatized health care system, they cost the provinces in
CHA funding claw backs and most pertinently, they endanger the life of the pregnant woman.
Barriers existing today in the Maritime provinces bear a striking resemblance to those documented
in the 1977 Badgley Report. While abortion is no longer criminalized, provincial attempts to
restrict access to service by way of health insurance regulations remain in violation of the Charter.
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